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THE ESSENTIAL ROLES OF AGENCY LAW
Gabriel Rauterberg*
This Article suggests a fundamental shift in how we think about agency . The
essential function of agency law lies not only in enabling the delegation of authority, as is widely suggested, but as significantly in its effect on creditors’
rights through asset partitioning . There is an increasing temptation in legal
scholarship to treat agency law as a sideshow confined to the first day of corporations class . This is because much of what agency law does in commerce
could simply be accomplished through standard-form contracts that provide
default terms for the relationships among firms, their managers, and third
parties . Even agency’s much-vaunted fiduciary duties can easily be altered or
waived by contract—and often are . This Article identifies the essential roles
of agency law, which parties could not contractually replicate, and the important efficiencies that flow from them .
Agency’s essential roles in commercial enterprise are twofold: first, to permit
one person to attribute the legal significance of his or her acts to another, and
second, to facilitate asset partitioning . Just as limited liability partitions off
the assets of a firm’s owners from the assets of the firm itself, agency law partitions off the assets of a firm’s managers from the firm’s own assets . Recognizing this function reframes the usual staging of contractual disputes in
agency as a zero-sum balancing act between the interests of third parties and
of principals . Whether owners or managers should be liable for a firm’s unpaid contracts is not just a win-lose distributional question—pitting the
firm’s creditors against insiders—but rather can be socially efficient . Through
simplifying and specializing asset pools, asset partitioning lowers the cost of
monitoring the firm’s assets and thus the cost of credit . To illustrate the asset
partitioning role of agency law, I unearth two doctrines ignored by scholarship—the “veil piercing” doctrines of agency .
Understanding agency’s asset partitioning role has extensive implications for
theory and practice . In addition to providing a unifying account of agency
law, the analysis resolves current disputes in the interpretation of its doctrine .
Most importantly, recognizing the essential roles of agency demonstrates its
ongoing significance to commercial and corporate law .

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. For particularly
helpful comments, I am grateful to John Armour, Samuel Bray, Anthony Casey, Anne Choike,
Barry Cushman, Tsilly Dagan, Merritt Fox, Andrew Gold, Zohar Goshen, Monica Hakimi,
Don Herzog, Henry Hansmann, Vic Khanna, Kyle Logue, Paul Miller, Peter Molk, John Morley, James Nelson, J.J. Prescott, Joseph Raz, Sarath Sanga, Robert Sitkoff, Henry Smith, Holger
Spamann, Richard Squire, Andrew Verstein, and participants at workshops at the Annual Conference of the International Society for New Institutional Economics, Columbia Law School,
and Notre Dame Law School.
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INTRODUCTION
The agency relationship is a foundation of modern commerce. Every
large firm manages its business activities through a dizzying array of agents
who carry out the firm’s affairs and bind it by the contracts they enter. 1 Directors, CEOs, managing partners—all are agents authorized to transact on
some firm’s behalf. As the Supreme Court noted in Hobby Lobby,
“[c]orporations, ‘separate and apart from’ the human beings who own, run,
and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all.” 2 Given the importance of agency law, the Supreme Court and federal circuit courts predictably remain preoccupied with disputes over the interpretation of its
doctrine. 3
Yet, scholarly understanding of agency law has not kept pace with its
continuing significance to commercial and corporate activity. In fact, the
most noticeable feature of the scholarship addressing agency law is how little
there is. Ever since Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., attacked agency doctrine a
century ago as “the resultant of a conflict between logic and good sense,” academics have almost universally neglected the topic in both law and economics. 4 While a sophisticated literature explores the economic concept of
“agency costs,” the concepts of agency law have often been neglected. 5
Though there has been a renewed theoretical focus on the functions of legal
1. Many economists and legal scholars have noted the pervasive role played by agents
in modern commercial life. See, e .g ., WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND
PARTNERSHIP 2 (3d ed. 2001) (“[M]ost of the world’s work is performed by agents.”); Kenneth
J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AM. E CON. REV . 537, 538
(1968) (“The principal-agent relation is very pervasive in all economies and especially in modern ones . . . .”).
2 . See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 707 (2014) (quoting Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec’y of U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 385
(3d Cir. 2013)); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 353 (1882).
3. For just the Supreme Court, this includes the famous Hobby Lobby decision, and the
recent decisions in Vance v . Ball State University, 570 U.S. 421 (2013); Maples v . Thomas, 565
U.S. 266 (2012); and Janus Capital Group, Inc . v . First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011),
all of which grappled with important agency law issues.
4 . See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency (pt. 2), 5 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14 (1891); see also
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Agency (pt. 1), 4 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1891). But see infra note 44
and accompanying text.
5. Agency costs are “the sum of the costs of designing, implementing, and maintaining
appropriate incentive and control systems [for agents] and the residual loss resulting from the
difficulty of solving these problems completely.” Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling,
Specific and General Knowledge, and Organizational Structure, in CONTRACT E CONOMICS
251, 262 (Lars Werin & Hans Wijkander eds., 1992) (citation omitted); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. E CON. 305 (1976).
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entities (such as partnerships, corporations, and LLCs), the same has not
been true of the agency relationships through which entities control their affairs. 6
This Article develops a theory of the functions that agency law serves in
the context of business enterprise that voluntary contracting alone could not
achieve. In this light, agency law’s most important contribution lies not only
in enabling the delegation of authority, as is widely suggested, but as significantly in its effect on creditors’ rights through asset partitioning. Specifically,
agency law empowers individuals to manage an enterprise’s affairs by attributing the legal significance of one person’s acts to another person (or a legal
entity like a corporation) while maintaining a separation between the personal assets and liabilities of those managers and the assets and liabilities of
the enterprise itself.
Understanding this role of agency law illuminates where it serves a function that contract law alone could not achieve. Most of what is usually emphasized in agency law could simply be accomplished through standardform contracts providing off-the-rack terms for the relationships among
firms, their managers, and third parties. 7 In this sense, the doctrine of agency
merely provides default terms around which parties can freely contract. Even
agency’s famous fiduciary duties can easily be altered or waived by contract—and often are. 8 This raises the question of whether the law of agency
does something more—and more important—than merely providing ready
default terms. This Article shows that agency law does serve an essential role
via attribution rules and asset partitioning. It is essential both in the sense
that parties could not replicate it through contracting and so it is a necessary
contribution of law, 9 and because it makes a crucial contribution to business
enterprise. In their classic paper on organizational law, Henry Hansmann
and Reinier Kraakman note that “[i]t is interesting to ask whether the legal
doctrine of agency is primitive, or whether it would be feasible to construct
the functional equivalent of agency using other, more basic elements of contract doctrine.” 10 Indeed, Hansmann and Kraakman note that while they fo-

6 . See, e .g ., Kenneth Ayotte & Henry Hansmann, Legal Entities as Transferable Bundles
of Contracts, 111 M ICH . L. REV . 715, 721 (2013); Anthony J. Casey, The New Corporate Web:
Tailored Entity Partitions and Creditors’ Selective Enforcement, 124 YALE L.J. 2680 (2015).
7. Thomas A. Simpson, Comment, A Comment on an Inherently Flawed Concept: Why
the Restatement (Third) of Agency Should Not Include the Doctrine of Inherent Agency Power,
57 ALA. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (2006) (“Most rules governing principal-agent relations are simply
a generic set of ‘off the rack’ rules that mimic what a reasonable principal and a reasonable
agent would have agreed to if they sat down and entered into negotiations.”); see also infra note
118 and accompanying text.
8 . See infra notes 149–151, 154–156 and accompanying text.
9. I use the term “essential” in the sense first employed by Hansmann and Kraakman
to denote a legal feature that could not feasibly be replicated through contract. See Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387,
416 (2000). This Article’s title is also, of course, an allusion to their seminal article.
10 . Id . at 406 n.27.
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cus on partitioning between the assets of a firm and its owners,
“[p]artitioning between the assets of the firm and the assets of the firm’s
managers is also important.” 11 I explore these questions here.
Attribution rules compose agency’s core function of enabling one person to attribute the legal significance of her acts to another. Asset partitioning consists of legal rules that separate the personal assets of an
organization’s insiders from the assets of a business entity, which we can generically call a firm. 12 When a firm defaults on its obligations, there is a natural human tendency to want to hold the firm’s controlling insiders—its
owners and managers—responsible for its unpaid debts. So, if a firm defaults
on a debt, it will be tempting to reach into the pockets of the directors who
approved the deal, the CEO who signed it, or the owners of the business in
order to repay creditors. Asset partitioning rules prevent this by defining and
limiting creditors’ rights in an event of default.
The best-known asset partitioning arrangement consists of the rules that
partition off the assets of a firm from the assets of its owners. The familiar
rule of limited liability or “owner shielding” bars the creditors of a firm from
seizing the personal assets of its owners. 13 Less familiar, but even more important, “entity shielding” prevents the personal creditors of individual owners from seizing the assets of the firm they own. 14 Entity shielding has been
called “the essential role of organizational law”—the body of law that governs the creation and form of legal entities. 15
Yet, an important and unexplored set of partitions exist to keep the assets of a firm and its managers separate. This Article identifies and explains
how agency law serves this asset partitioning role through what I term agent
and principal shielding. Agent shielding partitions off agents’ personal assets
from the assets of the firm on whose behalf they act. The inverse is also true.
Principal shielding bars the creditors of agents from being able to seize the
assets of the firm itself. Seeing how agency law establishes an asset partitioning arrangement casts fresh light on the efficiency advantages enabled by the
agency relationship. 16 This Article also identifies equitable doctrines—

11 . Id . at 398.
12 . Id . at 416 (explaining the role of asset partitioning rules).
13 . See Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. R EV. 1335,
1336 (2006) (reconceptualizing limited liability as owner shielding).
14 . See id . See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Organizational Law as
Asset Partitioning, 44 EUR. E CON. REV . 807 (2000); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The
Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434
(1998).
15. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9. Hansmann and Kraakman have noted that a
firm’s assets are partitioned off from its managers’ assets, although they did not develop that
particular observation. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 809. This Article provides that theory, identifying agency law as the body of law that partitions off the assets of
managers from a firm’s assets, showing how it accomplishes that role, and explaining the resulting and distinctive efficiencies.
16 . See infra Sections II.B.1–2.
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analogous to piercing the corporate veil—that courts use to sometimes set
aside agency’s asset partitions, holding managers liable for the debts of a firm
or a firm liable for the personal debts of its managers. 17
The asset partitioning analogy between agency and entity law highlights
two important similarities between them. The first is that aspects of both
agency law and entity law are irreducible to contract because they require the
law to serve the role of coordinating expectations among strangers. 18 The
second is that the different ways in which the law facilitates artificial legal
personality have a profound unity. The law recognizes every adult natural
person as a legal person able to contract, own property, sue, and be sued. 19
The law goes further, however. It allows natural persons to create new legal
persons—legal entities, such as business corporations, partnerships, or nonprofit corporations—through organizational law. It also allows one legal person to intermediate, or exercise the legal personality of a different legal person, under agency law. In a sense, this Article is dedicated to showing how
the viability of these forms of artificial legal personality—and the viability of
any form—requires certain kinds of rules, namely, attribution and partitioning rules that involve the law in coordinating the expectations of strangers.
The availability of these rules fundamentally transforms economic life in
myriad ways, but this Article focuses on their important transaction cost
benefits for contracting. 20 Naturally, there are also important disanalogies
between the two bodies of law, which I briefly explore below. 21
This Article contributes to three existing literatures. First, it extends the
insights of the asset partitioning approach from corporate law to commercial
and agency law. 22 Second, it opens new avenues for the nascent law-and-

17 . See infra Sections II.B.1–3.
18 . See infra Section II.B.2.
19 . See Edward M. Iacobucci & George G. Triantis, Economic and Legal Boundaries of
Firms, 93 VA. L. REV. 515, 518 (2007) (discussing the concept of legal personality).
20 . See infra Section II.B.
21 . See infra Section II.B.4.
22. Asset partitioning’s core insights have been applied to numerous other fields of law,
demonstrating asset partitioning to play an important role in trust law, bankruptcy law, investment funds, and the corporate group. See, e .g ., Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 14; see also
Douglas G. Baird & Anthony J. Casey, No Exit? Withdrawal Rights and the Law of Corporate
Reorganizations, 113 COLUM . L. REV. 1 (2013) (arguing that the partitioning of legal entities
effectively permits firms to circumvent a mandatory-seeming bankruptcy regime); Paul J.
Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473 (2005) (exploring patent law as a form of asset partitioning); John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers,
123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014) (analyzing economic consequences of the legal structure of investment funds); John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and
Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84 (2010) (analyzing the functional
impact of mutual fund exit rights on the conduct of fund investors); Richard Squire, Strategic
Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI . L. REV. 605 (2011).
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economics literature on agency. 23 Third, it identifies which aspects of agency
law are its essential contribution to commercial enterprise. 24
This account of agency law also has implications for theory and policy. It
illuminates the basic doctrinal architecture of agency, explaining why it
adopts waivable default rules and mandatory rules in the pattern it does, 25 as
well as explaining why the basic attribution rules of agency differ in contract
and tort. 26 It also suggests answers to controversial doctrinal disputes and
identifies how the rules of agency affect business outcomes. 27
A final caveat is also in order, which will become clearer in Section
III.B—this Article does not argue that all of agency law is asset partitioning,
nor even that all of its aspects that are irreducible to contract concern asset
partitioning. To preview conclusions, fiduciary duties are at the heart of
agency law but are largely contractual in character; and vicarious liability
could not be accomplished by contract but essentially belongs to tort law.
Rather, the central claim is that agency law’s essential contributions to the
contractual activity of corporations are empowering one individual to attribute their acts to another while also maintaining a separate pool of assets
among these actors. This overlooked function could not be accomplished by
contract, and must be provided by law. 28
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly sketches current doctrine and shows how this account of agency departs from existing interpretations. Part II explains how agency law creates attribution rules through
authority doctrine and establishes an asset partitioning arrangement by separating a firm’s assets from the assets of its agents. It then identifies the important efficiencies created by that arrangement. Part III demonstrates that
private parties could not feasibly replicate the role of agency law in establishing attribution rules and asset partitioning, and that along with vicarious liability, this role is agency’s essential contribution to commerce. Finally, Part
IV outlines some implications of the account offered here.

23 . See infra Section II.A.
24 . See infra Section III.A.
25 . See infra Section IV.B.
26 . See infra Section IV.A.
27 . See infra Sections IV.C–D.
28. Contrasting what could be accomplished by “contract” with what must be provided
by “law” will strike some readers as confused or eccentric. So, while I follow the literature in
using this contrast, a quick explanation of it is in order. What the asset partitioning literature
means by these terms is to contrast what individuals could accomplish through voluntary
agreements (enforced by courts or other third-party adjudicators backed by the state’s coercive
force) and what they could not accomplish in such a fashion. See supra note 22. It is assumed
that the law is involved in the enforcement of contractual obligations. The quest of the literature is to identify what can and cannot be accomplished through sophisticated use of such legally backed contracts, and thus what “law” in a broader sense of state-provided, rather than
voluntarily entered, “terms” must do. Put otherwise, is there anything agency law does that
contract and contract law could not do?
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RETHINKING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

Section I.A of this Part sketches some necessary background concepts
from agency law, while Section I.B challenges the conventional accounts of
agency doctrine in legal scholarship, emphasizing the law-and-economics
literature.
A. Background Concepts
An agency relationship 29 arises when one party (the “principal”) manifests consent to another (the “agent”) that the latter shall act on her behalf
and subject to her control, and the other consents to do so. 30 The agency relationship imposes duties on both the agent and principal and alters both of
their legal relationships with third parties. The relationship between the
agent and the principal is a fiduciary one. 31 The agent owes the principal duties of loyalty, 32 care, 33 and obedience, 34 inter alia, while the principal owes
the agent a duty to comply with his contract, including, most importantly, to
pay the agent’s wages. 35 As a result of the creation of the agency relationship,
the agent is endowed with the capacity to alter the principal’s legal rights and
duties as to third parties. This Article focuses on agency law in contract, but
the agent has the ability to alter the principal’s legal status in both contract
and tort. 36
In contract, the doctrine of authority governs the agent’s power to affect
the principal. The details are complex, but at the most general level, the
agent gains the ability to take legally binding action on the principal’s behalf
as to those matters to which the principal has manifested consent. 37 More
specifically, a contract entered by an agent binds the principal when it has
been actually authorized or apparently authorized. 38 Actual authority can be

29. For convenience, although this Article is about agency’s role within business enterprise, it will usually refer to the principal as female, the agent as male, and use “firm” to refer to
a generic business enterprise conducted through a legal entity, such as a corporation, LLC, or
LLP.
30. RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“Agency is the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a ‘principal’) manifests assent to another
person (an ‘agent’) that the agent shall act on the principal’s behalf and subject to the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.”).
31 . Id .; Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 392 (1982).
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01.
33 . Id . § 8.08.
34 . Id . § 8.09.
35 . Id . § 8.13.
36 . Id . § 7.03.
37 . Id . § 2.01. See infra Section II.B for a more detailed discussion of the rules of authority doctrine.
38. Estoppel, ratification, and inherent authority are sometimes available, but particularly the former two seem to represent the intrusion of other sets of legal principles into agency
law. In any event, they will not be discussed here.
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express, which involves spoken or written manifestations by the principal
that the agent is authorized, or implied, which involves nonverbal manifestations of authority. 39 Apparent authority binds a principal to a contract it did
not authorize, when a third party reasonably believed the agent had authority based on the principal’s conduct. 40 In agency law, the term “authority”
thus denotes an agent’s capacity to legally bind the principal when interacting with third parties. 41 Likewise, an agent, for purposes of contract, is an individual on whom the principal confers some measure of authority to bind
it. 42 In tort, the doctrine of vicarious liability governs the effects of agency. A
principal is strictly liable for any tortious harm to a third party resulting
from an agent’s conduct when the tort is committed within the scope of the
agent’s employment. 43
B. The Standard Account of Agency Law
A number of themes emerge from recent scholarship on agency law, and
much of it casts fresh light on aspects of agency’s doctrine. One theme is the
analysis of elements from other areas of private law that motivate specific
agency doctrines or cases. For instance, several scholars have noted the role
of tort-like considerations in agency case law, 44 while others have assimilated
agency to principles drawn from contract law. For example, Randy Barnett
has looked at agency through the lens of consent, while Gerard McMeel has

39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (“An agent acts with actual authority
when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act.”). Whether an agent is actually authorized is based on how a
reasonable agent would perceive the conduct of the principal. See, e .g ., id .; Interocean Shipping
Co. v. Nat’l Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 537 (2d Cir. 1975); TERENCE COGHLIN ET
AL., T IME C HARTERS para. 2.19 (Informa Law, 7th ed. 2014).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.03 (“Apparent authority is the power held by
an agent or other actor to affect a principal’s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is
traceable to the principal’s manifestations.”).
41 . Id .
42. Note that agency law’s usage of both “authority” and “agent” is considerably narrower than the terms’ usage among economists, where authority involves any relationship of
hierarchy and an agent is any individual with the power to affect another party. See, e .g .,
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, T HE E CONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); George
Baker et al., Informal Authority in Organizations, 15 J.L. E CON. & ORG. 56 (1999).
43. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.03.
44 . See, e .g ., John Armour & Michael J. Whincop, The Proprietary Foundations of Corporate Law, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 429, 445–46 (2007); Eric Rasmusen, Agency Law and
Contract Formation, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 369 (2004); Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 YALE L.J. 168 (1981). The foundational analysis of
the efficiency of allocating liability to the lowest-cost avoider in tort is, of course, G UIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND E CONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
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emphasized reliance. 45 Other scholarship has helpfully analyzed particular
doctrines or problems within the broader world of agency. 46 One doctrine,
vicarious liability, has a vast literature devoted to its functional role and efficiency, 47 though this Article will only touch upon it. As for agency in contract, the most prominent theme has been the fiduciary duties it imposes on
agents to ameliorate agency costs. 48
This Article offers a different perspective on agency. While the legal literature has overwhelmingly emphasized agency’s distinctive liabilitycreating features, such as apparent authority and vicarious liability, this Article addresses agency law’s vital liability-limiting function, which shields both
a corporate principal and its human agents through partitioning off their assets from each other. While the agency literature has focused on agency’s
remedial, ex post aspects, such as ensuring that tort victims receive recompense for agents’ wrongs, 49 this Article emphasizes agency law’s ultimately
more important ex ante role in expanding the world of action for commercial firms. A comment by Paula Dalley is paradigmatic of the current literature’s emphasis on agency’s remedial aspects: “[T]he purpose of agency law
is to restore the status quo after a person chooses to use an agent.” 50 This Article contends that agency’s most important role is how it alters the status
quo, empowering and facilitating commercial activity in ways that private
parties could not recreate through contract.

45. Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency Law with Contract Theory, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 1969 (1987); Gerard McMeel, Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Agency,
116 L.Q. REV. 387, 400, 402 (2000); see also RODERICK M UNDAY, AGENCY: LAW AND
PRINCIPLES 15 (3d ed. 2016) (“Many would claim that consent lies at the heart of agency.”);
Michael J. Whincop, Nexuses of Contracts, the Authority of Corporate Agents, and Doctrinal
Indeterminacy: From Formalism to Law and Economics, 20 U.N.S.W. L.J. 274 (1997) (arguing
that the legal rules of authority doctrine should minimize the joint costs of unauthorized transactions).
46 . See Deborah A. DeMott, The First Restatement of Agency: What Was the Agenda?,
32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 17, 29–30 (2007) (surveying various scholars on the meaning of the law of
agency); George M. Cohen, The Collusion Problem in Agency Law (Univ. of Va. Sch. of Law
Legal Studies Working Papers Series, Paper No. 00-2, 2000), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=198909 (on file with the Michigan Law Review) (focusing on collusion problems as an explanation for agency doctrines).
47 . See, e .g ., John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized
Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 M ICH . L. REV. 386, 401, 433 (1981);
Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L.
E CON. & ORG . 53, 53–54 (1986) [hereinafter Kraakman, Gatekeepers]; Reinier Kraakman, The
Economic Functions of Corporate Liability, in CORPORATE G OVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS’
LIABILITIES 178, 193–97 (Klaus J. Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., 1985).
48 . See, e .g ., Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 (1991); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & E CON. 425 (1993); Robert
H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 197 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).
49 . See, e .g ., Kraakman, Gatekeepers, supra note 47, at 60.
50. Paula J. Dalley, A Theory of Agency Law, 72 U. PITT. L. REV . 495, 497 (2011).
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I I . AGENCY LAW AS ASSET PARTITIONING
The doctrinal details of how agency law separates the asset pools of a
firm and its managers are complex, so an initial summary of the idea may
prove helpful. The main claim of this Article is that agency law facilitates
contracting in two ways that could not be accomplished through legal persons’ interactions without a set of preexisting rules provided by law. The first
is simple, though still indispensable: the law of agency enables one person to
exercise the legal personality of another person in connection with third parties.
The second way is by partitioning off the assets of the managers of an
organization from the assets of the organization itself. Just as organizational
law partitions off the assets of a firm’s owners from the assets of the firm itself, so agency law partitions off the assets of a firm’s managers from the
firm’s own assets. Organizational law governs the various legal entities employed by business enterprises, such as corporations, LLCs, or LLPs. It typically establishes two features that a business that makes no use of a legal
entity would lack. 51 First is owner shielding (better known as limited liability), which shields the assets of a firm’s owners from creditors of the firm. 52
Second is entity shielding, which shields the firm’s own assets from the
creditors of its owners. 53
Like organizational law, agency law implements an asset partitioning arrangement in the commercial firm. Agent shielding shields the assets of individual agents from the creditors of the firm, while principal shielding
protects the firm’s assets from its agents’ creditors. These limits on creditors’
rights arise because by making it easier for creditors to assess and monitor an
asset pool, they reduce the costs of credit for a firm, thus increasing the
wealth that can be shared among all those who contract with the firm.
Table 1 illustrates the relationships among owner and entity shielding,
and agent and principal shielding.

51. Hansmann et al., supra note 13, at 1336. A corporation is “a legal person . . . that has
a legal personality distinct from the natural persons who make it up, exists indefinitely apart
from them, and has the legal powers that its constitution gives it.” Corporation, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518 (1819); Harris v. Stony Clove Lake Acres Inc., 608 N.Y.S.2d 584, 586 (App. Div. 1994) (“A
corporation, even when wholly owned by a single individual, has a separate legal existence
from its shareholders . . . .”).
52. Hansmann et al., supra note 13, at 1336.
53 . Id .
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TABLE 1:
FORMS OF ASSET PARTITIONING IN COMMERCIAL FIRMS
SOURCE OF LIABILITY

LEGAL PERSON WHOSE
ASSETS ARE SHIELDED

FORM OF PARTITIONING

BUSINESS ENTITY

OWNER

OWNER SHIELDING

OWNER

BUSINESS ENTITY

ENTITY SHIELDING

AGENT
(WITH AUTHORITY)

AGENT’S PERSONAL
ASSETS

AGENT SHIELDING

AGENT
(WITHOUT AUTHORITY)

BUSINESS ENTITY

PRINCIPAL SHIELDING

Let us turn now to fleshing these ideas out. I first consider the theory of
asset partitioning, and then examine the doctrine through which agency partitions managers’ assets from those of the firm. I then identify and explain
the efficiency advantages generated by agency law as asset partitioning.
While some of these advantages parallel organizational law, others are
unique to agency.
A. The Theory of Asset Partitioning
The literature on the role of asset partitioning in different areas of law
has grown enormously in size and sophistication. 54 This Section offers a brief
summary for those new to this literature, to provide the context for understanding its application to agency law.
The essential idea of asset partitioning is that legal rules can reduce the
costs creditors face in assessing the value of a firm’s assets by partitioning the
assets held in the firm’s name from the assets of those involved in the firm.
As Robert Sitkoff has put it, “[t]he core function of asset partitioning
rules . . . is to separate the personal property and obligations of the organiza54 . See, e .g ., Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Essay, Private Debt and the
Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV . 1209, 1230 (2006) (discussing the
secured loan from an asset partitioning perspective); Marcus Cole, Limiting Liability Through
Bankruptcy, 70 U. CIN. L. REV . 1245 (2002) (arguing that the distinguishing characteristic of
bankruptcy law is temporal asset partitioning); Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity
Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. REV . 857 (2014) (exploring the efficiency advantages of the faster
payouts enabled by the asset partitioning role of clearinghouses’ set-off rights); Richard Squire,
The Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806, 810–12 (2009) (contrasting the
economic consequences of “symmetrical” and “asymmetrical” asset partitioning arrangements). In a short but important essay, Robert Thompson observed that agency rules could
alter the asset partitioning arrangement of a corporate group. See Robert B. Thompson, Agency
Law and Asset Partitioning, 71 U. CIN. L. REV . 1321 (2003). Thompson does not discuss the
general asset partitioning role of agency in commerce, confining his remarks to the corporate
group.
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tion’s insiders from the property and obligations of the organization.” 55 The
theory begins with the observation that when a legal person enters a contract
or incurs a tort liability, all of the resources that she owns—her “pool of assets”—are, as a default, available to recompense a counterparty or victim. 56
From the perspective of a creditor considering a contractual relationship
with that person, that asset pool is the security that exists to “bond,” or render credible, her contractual commitments and to levy upon in the event of
default. Yet, the law can partition off some of those assets and protect them
from creditors’ claims. For instance, in many states an individual’s primary
residence is protected from seizure by an unsatisfied tort claimant, unlike the
remainder of her assets. 57 Such legal arrangements divide up assets, which
the law could, in principle, treat as a single pool available to creditors. By doing so, the law creates winners and losers. For instance, a creditor may go
unpaid because the debtor’s bank balance is zero, even though the debtor
owns a valuable home. It is natural to view such arrangements through a zero-sum lens in which creditors are the losers and debtors the winners. 58
What is so enlightening about asset partitioning is that it shows how a clear
pattern of creditors’ rights, which partitions off some assets, can actually be
efficient for the debtor and creditors.
The theory of asset partitioning argues that partitioning asset pools can
be socially efficient, rather than solely redistributive, where the partitioning
reduces information costs for creditors in appraising and monitoring an asset pool for its value. Richard Posner, as well as Anthony Kronman and
Thomas Jackson, recognized the initial fact that simplifying a set of resources
by dividing it up into smaller pools could make monitoring easier and thus
less costly for creditors. 59 Smaller pools reduce creditor information costs
because they reduce the number of factors whose value must be assessed
when determining the risk of default and the scope of a likely recovery if default occurs. 60

55. Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance plus Asset Partitioning, in THE
W ORLDS OF THE T RUST 428, 434 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013); see also Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV . 773, 849 (2001).
56. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 810.
57 . See, e .g ., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4914 (2010); Victor D. López, State Homestead
Exemptions and Bankruptcy Law: Is It Time for Congress to Close the Loophole?, 7 RUTGERS
BUS. L.J. 143, 149 tbl.1 (2010). But see M ASS. G EN. LAWS ch. 235, § 34 (2018).
58 . See, e .g ., Paul Halpern et al., An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law, 30 U. T ORONTO L.J. 117, 148 (1980) (“[A] limited liability regime will, in many cases, create incentives for owners to exploit a moral hazard and transfer uncompensated business
risks to creditors . . . .”).
59. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities
Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1149–52 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 516–17 (1976).
60. Posner, supra note 59, at 516–17 (emphasizing the simplification benefit of subdividing asset pools).
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Subsequent work identified a more important benefit of asset partitioning that flows from shielding assets from creditors’ claims in ways that permit creditors to specialize in monitoring a particular kind of asset pool.
Hansmann and Kraakman provide the classic example of this benefit. 61 Consider an airline company about to purchase a car rental business. It can purchase the car rental and organize it as a legally separate but wholly owned
subsidiary, or operate it as a division within the airline company itself. In either case, the management of the newly combined business will be the same.
But if the car rental business operates as a subsidiary, then creditors who
specialize in assessing the value of car rental assets and the riskiness of car
rental liabilities can incur lower monitoring costs by lending solely to the
specialized subsidiary than they would in monitoring the combined business
as a whole. 62
Creditors with specialized monitoring abilities are ubiquitous. 63 For instance, car manufacturers that lease cars to a rental business will likely have
great expertise in cars’ value as collateral and the risks they face, but comparatively none in the value and risk of airlines. A combined business thus faces
a higher interest rate than a creditor would need to charge if they already
understood the business. By disaggregating asset pools along specialized
lines, asset partitioning avoids this problem. It empowers creditors with differing evaluation skills to lend to asset pools suiting their comparative expertise by separating them off from other assets.
Hansmann and coauthors famously offered asset partitioning as the core
efficiency benefit of the legal entity and of organizational law—the body of
law that governs the formation and structure of legal entities. 64 A legal entity,
they suggest, is defined by owner shielding, which insulates the assets of the
owners of a firm from creditors’ claims against the firm itself, and, more importantly, entity shielding, which insulates the firm’s asset pool from creditors of the firm’s owners. 65 They refer to entity shielding’s asset partitioning
function as “the essential role of all forms of organizational law” 66—essential

61. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 811.
62 . Id .
63 . See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 59, at 1159 (“[T]he expected monitoring costs
of some creditors are almost certain to be lower than the costs of others, even at comparable
levels of risk, and to rise more slowly in response to increases in risk as well, because of the
comparative advantage these creditors enjoy in obtaining and assessing information about the
debtor’s behavior.”); see also Mark B. Wessman, Purchase Money Inventory Financing: The
Case for Limited Cross-Collateralization, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283, 1301 n.167 (1990) (discussing
creditors who have “specialized knowledge of particular kinds of assets”); David A. Skeel, Jr.,
Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1566 (2004) (reviewing REINIER KRAAKMAN
ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
(2004)) (discussing specialized monitoring abilities of creditors).
64. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 415–16.
65. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 810.
66. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 390.
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both because parties could not replicate entity shielding through contract
and because of its important efficiency benefits for firms. 67
For both limited liability and entity shielding, there is also an equitable
doctrine that courts sometimes use to “pierce” or disregard partitions among
assets. For limited liability, this doctrine is the notorious “piercing of the
corporate veil,” which remains the most litigated 68 and one of the most controversial doctrines in corporate law. 69 Piercing the corporate veil involves
disregarding limited liability and holding the owners of a firm liable for the
firm’s unpaid debts. 70 For entity shielding, the equitable remedy is the opposite: “reverse veil piercing” involves “disregarding the corporate form to
reach assets of a corporation for debts of a shareholder.” 71 While far less analyzed in scholarship, reverse veil piercing is nonetheless a commonly applied
doctrine. 72 In fact, equitable doctrines that license courts to sometimes disregard the separation between agents’ assets and firm’s assets accompany the
form of asset partitioning established by agency law. 73 Surprisingly, these
doctrines, while important, have largely eluded notice, let alone examination,
in the legal and economic literature.
B. How Agency Law Establishes Attribution Rules and Asset Partitioning
This Section explains how agency law establishes attribution rules and
an asset partitioning arrangement—one that partitions off the assets of a
firm’s agents from the assets of the firm itself. In the first respect, agency’s

67 . Id . at 393.
68. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL
L. REV . 1036, 1036 & n.1 (1991).
69 . See Richmond McPherson & Nader Raja, Empirical Study, Corporate Justice: An
Empirical Study of Piercing Rates and Factors Courts Consider When Piercing the Corporate
Veil, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 931, 934 (2010) (recounting the “controversial history in
American business law” of veil piercing).
70 . See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 267 F.3d 340, 353
(3d Cir. 2001) (“ ‘[P]iercing the corporate veil’ doctrine . . . treats a corporation and its shareholders as identical for purposes of suit, thereby imposing personal liability on shareholders.”).
71. Pac. Dev., Inc. v. United States, No. 77-0690, 1979 WL 1283, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 3,
1979). Interestingly, reverse veil piercing recently received attention due to its applicability to
the Supreme Court case Burwell v . Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc ., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). See, e .g ., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Essay, A Critique of the Corporate Law Professors’ Amicus Brief in Hobby
Lobby and Conestoga Wood, 100 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 7 (2014).
72 . See, e .g ., McCall Stock Farms, Inc. v. United States, 14 F.3d 1562, 1568 (Fed. Cir.
1993); Towe Antique Ford Found. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 999 F.2d 1387, 1390–94 (9th Cir.
1993); Zahra Spiritual Tr. v. United States, 910 F.2d 240, 243–45 (5th Cir. 1990); Seghers v. El
Bizri, 513 F. Supp. 2d 694, 703 (N.D. Tex. 2007); Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito Am., Inc.,
852 F. Supp. 740, 773–74 (E.D. Wis. 1994); In re Mid-West Metal Prods., Inc. v. Simpson, 13
B.R. 562, 566 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981); Taylor v. Newton, 257 P.2d 68, 72–73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1953); Cargill, Inc. v. Hedge, 375 N.W.2d 477, 478–80 (Minn. 1985). See generally Kathryn
Hespe, Preserving Entity Shielding: How Corporations Should Respond to Reverse Piercing of the
Corporate Veil, J. BUS. & SEC. L., Fall 2013, at 69.
73 . See infra Section II.B.3.
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rules decide exactly what is an “authorized” and an “unauthorized” contract
entered by an agent, which will or will not bind a firm. In the latter respect,
agency law shields the firm’s managers from joint liability with the firm for
conduct they undertake on its behalf and the firm from the creditors of unauthorized claims against its managers. It is the rules of agency law that enable, say, a corporation’s board or its officers to conduct a firm’s commercial
affairs without becoming personally liable for them.
1.

Attribution Rules

Typically, an individual who signs a contract is bound by it. 74 Not so if
the individual is acting as an agent, however. In this case, the principal, who
is absent, is liable—the core function of agency. Further, an agent can avoid
personal liability on a contract he enters if two conditions are met. First, the
agent must disclose the principal’s identity and the fact that he is acting on
the principal’s behalf (“disclosed principal doctrine”). 75 If an agent does not
disclose that he is acting for a principal (an “undisclosed principal”), or discloses the principal but not her specific identity (a “partially disclosed principal”), then the agent remains jointly bound to the contract with the
principal. 76 Second, the agent must have entered the contract with either actual or apparent authority. 77 If an agent enters a contract on a disclosed principal’s behalf, but without authority, then the agent (and not the principal) is
a party to and bound by that contract. 78 If the agent meets both of these conditions, however, then the law of agency inserts a new rule where the principal is alone liable and no recourse can be had against the agent’s assets. 79
These rules are summarized in Table 2.

74. A famous New York case stated the obvious: “[T]he signer of a deed or other instrument is conclusively bound thereby.” Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. Lelakis, 129 F.3d 113 (2d Cir.
1997) (quoting Pimpinello v. Swift & Co., 170 N.E. 530, 531 (N.Y. 1930)).
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (“When an agent
acting with actual or apparent authority makes a contract on behalf of a disclosed principal, (1)
the principal and the third party are parties to the contract; and (2) the agent is not a party to
the contract unless the agent and third party agree otherwise.”).
76 . Id . § 6.03(2). The undisclosed principal typically also remains a party to the contract. Id . §§ 6.03(1), (3), 2.06.
77 . Id . §§ 2.01–.03, 6.10.
78 . I D . § 6.10.
79 . Id . “The agent for a disclosed principal . . . is not responsible under the contract.”
Kientzler v. Sun Line Greece Special Shipping Co., 779 F. Supp. 342, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(quoting Bowns v. Royal Viking Lines, Inc., 1977 A.M.C. 2159, 2163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)).
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TABLE 2:
PARTIES LIABLE FOR CONTRACT
AUTHORIZATION OF CONTRACT
GIVEN DISCLOSURE OF
PRINCIPAL’S IDENTITY

IF AUTHORIZED BY
PRINCIPAL

IF NOT AUTHORIZED BY
PRINCIPAL

DISCLOSED PRINCIPAL

PRINCIPAL

AGENT

UNIDENTIFIED PRINCIPAL

AGENT & PRINCIPAL

AGENT

UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL

AGENT & PRINCIPAL

AGENT

Thus, agency law permits an agent to act on behalf of a firm and attributes the authorized contract he entered to the firm, while not holding the
agent liable to the creditors of that contract. 80 So, while the directors of a
corporation are responsible for ratifying many of its most important transactions, they are generally not themselves parties to those contracts unless they
specifically personally guarantee a contract. 81 Likewise, the firm is not liable
for contracts entered by an agent when the agent exceeds the scope of his authority: “A principal will not be bound where, as here, the agent exceeds the
scope of his authority . . . .” 82
2.

Attribution Rules, Asset Partitioning, and the Role of Agency Law

Although managers and the firm are engaged in joint economic activity
for which they could be held jointly liable, the law of agency implicitly partitions off the assets of each from the other. Indeed, one can easily observe that
the asset pools of a firm and its employees are generally kept legally separate.
That is, if a manager enters bankruptcy, his creditors cannot levy on the assets of the firm (his principal) to be made whole. Likewise, if a firm defaults
on its debts, then its creditors cannot seize the assets of its individual managers. In parallel to owner shielding and entity shielding, I refer to this as prin80. It may be objected that there is no magic to the asset partitioning arrangement established by agency law. After all, disclosed principal doctrine ensures a third party had notice
of the principal’s identity. This is no objection, however, as all asset partitioning arrangements
impose notice requirements for their efficacy, such as labeling requirements for corporations
(“Inc.”), to ensure limited liability. Hansmann et al., Legal Entities, Asset Partitioning, and
Evolution of Organizations, Presentation at the University of Michigan Law School Law
and Economics Workshop 12 (Nov. 11, 2004), http://www.law.umich.edu
/centersandprograms/lawandeconomics/workshops/documents/fall2004/hansmann.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B4DZ-FP58].
81. Keskal v. Modrakowski, 164 N.E. 333, 333 (1928) (“When the agency is disclosed,
and the contract relates to the matter of the agency, and is within the authority conferred, the
agent will not be personally bound . . . .” (quoting Hall v. Lauderdale, 46 N.Y. 70, 74 (1871))).
82. Van Arsdale v. Metro. Title Guar. Co., 425 N.Y.S.2d 482, 484 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
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cipal shielding and agent shielding. In Section II.B.3, I discuss the equitable
doctrines that sometimes disregard these partitions, and in Section III.A.1,
why contract law alone could not create principal shielding. Here, I briefly
discuss more general differences between agency and contract law.
The crucial point is that the use of an agent to intermediate the legal personality of the principal fundamentally alters the basic situation of contract.
Contract law addresses the expression of an individual’s legal personality,
but when one individual exercises another’s legal personality, it raises a
whole set of novel issues that require a distinct body of law—agency law—to
resolve them. Without the law of agency, the law would either not be able to
let one legal person exercise another’s personality, or the asset pools of the
two would collapse. Thus, agency law defines and polices the intermediation
of legal personality. Consider some basic differences between the normal situation of contract and a contract between a principal and a third party who
do not meet but bind each other through an agent.
Structurally, the basic relationship in contract is dyadic. One principal
exchanges a set of promises with another principal. Contracts certainly can
become more complicated, but in its most idealized form, a contract is simply a bilateral exchange of goods, services, or money for consideration of
some kind. Agency, even in its simplest form, is triadic. It involves a third
party, an agent, and a principal. The principal and agent interact directly, as
do the agent and third party. The principal, however, does not interact directly with the third party; instead, only the agent interacts with the third
party, while typically only the third party and principal are bound by the
contract. The relationship of authority, which is extrinsic to the dyadic negotiation and exchange between agent and third party, determines who is
bound by the contract the agent enters. Consider two simple cases involving
disagreement between the agent and principal regarding whether the principal authorized a contract that the agent entered with a third party. Such a
disagreement can arise from a variety of sources. It could be an innocent
mistake on the agent’s part, in which he sincerely but unreasonably misinterpreted the principal’s conduct to be enjoining him to enter the contract
on the principal’s behalf. It could be the principal’s good faith mistake. It
could also be insincere opportunism by either the principal or the agent.
Take first the case of agent opportunism. Seeking a lower cost of capital,
the agent entered a contract for a loan, purporting to enter it at the principal’s behest, when in fact the loan is meant to serve the agent’s personal purposes. Here, the principal will wish to not be bound by the contract. What
will determine whether the principal is bound depends on whether either the
agent or the third party reasonably believed based on the principal’s manifestations that she desired the agent to enter the contract. The key question is
not a matter of contract doctrine. It is a question to be resolved under authority doctrine as a matter of actual authority and apparent authority.
The same is true in the case of the principal’s opportunism. Say the principal told the agent to enter a contract, but seeing that it is now of negative
value, the principal seeks to renege, claiming that it is a personal contract of
the agent that was not authorized. The governing doctrine is the same.
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Again, authority doctrine will be called upon to resolve whether the law will
find the agent or principal bound to the contract.
3.

Equitable Remedies for Piercing Agent and Principal Shielding

Certain equitable doctrines empower courts to disregard asset partitioning arrangements. “Piercing the corporate veil,” which is among the most
famous doctrines of corporate law, allows a court to sometimes disregard the
legal separation between a firm and its owners and hold a firm’s owners personally liable for the debts of the firm. 83 This equitable doctrine is testimony
to the desire of those wronged by a firm to hold its owners liable, and to the
importance of the normal role of limited liability in partitioning off the owners’ assets from the firm’s. Conversely, reverse veil piercing allows courts to
disregard the separation between the assets of a firm and its owners again,
this time by holding a firm liable for the personal debts of its owner. 84
Although to my knowledge they have never been remarked upon, there
are also existing doctrines that allow courts to disregard the typical partition
between the assets of a firm and its managers. The first doctrine holds a
manager liable for the debts of the firm. I refer to this as agent piercing. 85
Agent piercing occurs when a court holds that it is inequitable to maintain
“the separate existence” of the corporation from its managers. The case law
abounds with examples of this equitable piercing. 86 For instance, in LaFond
v . Basham, plaintiffs sued a construction company for defaulting on its remodeling contract, as well as the corporation’s president in his personal capacity. 87 The president was not a shareholder of the corporation, but he “was
a member of the board of directors” and “dictated all [the firm’s] policy and
activity.” 88 The court held the corporation’s president individually liable for
the contractual default, stating that the “corporate entity may be disregarded
and corporate directors may be held personally liable if equity so requires.” 89
The analogy between agent piercing and veil piercing suggests a position
that is advanced repeatedly in cases litigating agent piercing. Where an own83 . See supra Section II.A.
84 . See supra Section II.A.
85. The allusion, of course, is to veil piercing, which sets aside limited liability in order
to hold a firm’s owners liable for its debts. See supra Section II.A.
86. There are a large number of cases involving agent piercing based on equitable remedies. See, e .g ., Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., 119 F.3d 1044, 1051 (2d Cir. 1997); In re
MacDonald, 114 B.R. 326, 332–33 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990); McCallum Family L.L.C. v. Winger,
221 P.3d 69, 76 (Colo. App. 2009); Sheffield Servs. Co. v. Trowbridge, 211 P.3d 714, 721 (Colo.
App. 2009); Guilder v. Corinth Constr. Corp., 651 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707 (App. Div. 1997); Lally v.
Catskill Airways, Inc., 603 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621 (App. Div. 1993); cf . Nix v. Miller, 57 P. 1084,
1085–86 (Colo. 1899); Ward v. Cooper, 685 P.2d 1382, 1383–84 (Colo. App. 1984); Macaluso
v. Jenkins, 420 N.E.2d 251, 255–57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Rosebud Corp. v. Boggio, 561 P.2d 367,
371 (Colo. App. 1977).
87. 683 P.2d 367, 368–69 (Colo. App. 1984).
88 . Id . at 369.
89 . Id .
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er of a firm is also a manager of the firm, veil piercing and agent piercing can
act as competing or concurrent theories of liability. 90 Both aim to set aside the
corporate personality of a firm in favor of personal liability for
ers. 91 The difference is that veil piercing sets aside organizational law in order to hold the owners liable by piercing the corporate veil, while agent
piercing sets aside agency law in order to hold managers liable.
As with agent piercing, courts have used equitable grounds to hold principals liable. I refer to this doctrine, which enables the creditors of an agent
who was acting without the principal’s authorization to nonetheless seize the
principal’s assets for recompense, as principal piercing.
These equitable cases are especially illuminating. In JSC Foreign, a corporation’s sole officer had an outstanding debt to the plaintiff. 92 The plaintiff
sought to levy on the assets of the corporation for which the officer worked
in order to pay the debt, and the court permitted the plaintiff to do so, finding that the officer dominated the corporation. 93 The court thereby permitted a creditor of an individual officer to seize the assets of the firm itself,
although the officer was not an owner. 94 Similarly, in LFC Marketing Group
v . Loomis, the court permitted a judgment creditor of a failed real estate
transaction with William Lange to levy on the assets of the corporation
Lange managed. 95 The court noted that Lange did “not own a single share”
of the corporation, but it found that Lange was the “ultimate authority” over
the corporation’s affairs. 96 There are a large number of other such cases featuring the equitable piercing of a corporate principal. 97
Table 3 depicts the equitable remedy of piercing the corporate personality that corresponds to each form of asset partitioning.

90 . See, e .g ., Boggio, 561 P.2d at 369–71.
91 . See LucidRisk, LLC v. Ogden, 615 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7–8 (D. Conn. 2009).
92. JSC Foreign Econ. Ass’n Technostroyexport v. Int’l Dev. & Trade Servs., Inc., 306 F.
Supp. 2d 482, 484–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
93 . Id . at 486.
94 . Id . at 487. In In re Destiny Enterprises, LLC, No. 2-07-BK-00542, 2008 WL 5047808,
at *3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. July 14, 2008), the plaintiff sought a “judgment . . . against the Debtor, its
manager, and related entities whereby the obligations of the manager . . . would be deemed to
be the liabilities of the Debtor.” The court noted that, if “successful, the Debtor no longer exists
as a separate entity. Therefore, all assets of the Debtor become the assets of the Debtor’s manager.” Id . at *3 & n.14.
95. 8 P.3d 841, 845–46 (Nev. 2000).
96 . LFC Mktg . Grp ., 8 P.3d at 847.
97 . See, e .g ., Towe Antique Ford Found. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 999 F.2d 1387, 1391–
93 (9th Cir. 1993); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 935, 939–40 (10th Cir. 1975);
Fitzgerald v. Cent. Bank & Tr. Co., 257 F.2d 118, 120–21 (10th Cir. 1958); United States v.
Kitsos, 770 F. Supp. 1230, 1236–37 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d, 968 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1992); Loving
Saviour Church v. United States, 556 F. Supp. 688, 693 (D.S.D. 1983), aff’d, 728 F.2d 1085 (8th
Cir. 1984); C.F. Tr., Inc. v. First Flight Ltd. P’ship, 580 S.E.2d 806 (Va. 2003); Litchfield Asset
Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d 298, 316 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); State v. Easton, 647 N.Y.S.2d
904, 908–10 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
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TABLE 3:
EQUITABLE FORMS OF DISREGARDING CORPORATE PERSONALITY
FORM OF PARTITIONING

EQUITABLE REMEDY

OWNER SHIELDING

VEIL PIERCING

ENTITY SHIELDING

REVERSE VEIL PIERCING

AGENT SHIELDING

AGENT PIERCING

PRINCIPAL SHIELDING

PRINCIPAL PIERCING

To be clear, equitable piercing is not the normal case. Rather, firms are
typically shielded from the personal creditors of their managers, and the
firm’s managers shielded from the creditors of the firm.
4.

Some Relationships Between Entity and Agency Law

While this Article generally explores the analogy between entity and
agency law, it is worth pausing to appreciate the respects in which they are
distinct. 98 First, agency law plays multiple distinct roles. This Article has focused on two roles—asset partitioning and attribution rules by which agency
law enables a legal person to bind itself contractually to third parties by way
of its agents and define its separate pool of assets. A third, quite different
role, is vicarious liability in tort. Section IV.A will discuss how appreciating
asset partitioning helps explain why agency’s doctrine differs in contract and
tort. A fourth role is that agency law imposes fiduciary duties between an
employer and employees, as discussed in Section III.B. Importantly, neither
the second nor third function of agency involves asset partitions, as reflected
in the different definitions and liabilities of agents under each of those roles.
These are important differences between the two bodies of law. What I
take to be the critical similarity is that both agency doctrine and entity
shielding coordinate the expectations of individuals with no ongoing relationship in order to keep the asset pools of related actors separate. Legal entities could not function without attribution rules—indeed, the attribution
rules entities use are simply those of agency law—and without asset partitions separating off the assets of those intuitively “responsible” for a firm (its
owners and managers) from the assets of the firm itself. Put another way, attribution rules determine who is liable for a given act, while asset partitioning rules determine which assets are available to satisfy a given actor’s
liabilities. These two sets of rules share two important affinities, although
they are distinct. First, they are codependent: a legal person cannot success-

98. I am particularly grateful to Henry Hansmann for clarifying many of the issues discussed here.
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fully contract without both sets of rules in operation. Second, because, in
agency law, both rules scaffold interactions between previously unrelated
persons who make credible commitments to each other, agency law must
play a role in coordinating parties’ expectations.
C. Benefits of Agency as Asset Partitioning
Agency law separates agents’ assets from the assets of the firm on whose
behalf they act. Its doctrine determines when an agent and when a principal
will be bound by a given contract. Agency law thus establishes a pattern of
creditors’ rights. It defines the rights of creditors of the firm and its agents
because it determines who is liable for which contracts and thus whose assets
act as security for them. So, parties to a contract entered by an agent and authorized by his disclosed principal can look to the principal’s assets—but not
the agent’s—to satisfy their claims, while personal creditors of the agent can
look only to the agent’s assets. This asset partitioning function establishes
barriers to legal claims among different pools of assets, each of which can
now serve separately as security for a different group of creditors. This Section identifies and explains the efficiency benefits of the asset partitioning
arrangement created by agency. While some of these benefits will be familiar
to scholars of law and economics, others are distinctive to agency.
1.

Reducing Creditor Monitoring Costs

Asset partitioning’s chief efficiency advantage is that it reduces the cost
of credit because it empowers creditors with varying comparative advantages
to evaluate and monitor different forms of credit risk, which exist among
distinct asset pools. 99 Through agent and principal shielding, agency law
frees agents’ creditors from worrying about the success of the firm on whose
behalf they work, and frees the firm’s creditors from concern for the assets
and creditworthiness of the firm’s many agents.
Agency law thus empowers specialized creditors with varied appraisal
and monitoring abilities to focus on the types of assets and risks in which
they specialize. Such differing monitoring expertise is pervasive. 100 Creditors
of large public corporations will often specialize in analyzing public disclosures filed with the SEC, assessing ratings for corporate debt, or scrutinizing
deal documents, while lacking any special skill in deciding whether a firm’s
99. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 814 (“The basic efficiency advantage of
asset partitioning—the fact that the aggregate cost of credit can be reduced by appropriately
dividing up a fixed pool of assets for purposes of pledging those assets as security to diverse
creditors—has long been familiar in the law and economics literature . . . .”).
100 . See supra notes 61–63 and accompanying text; see also Frederick Tung, Leverage in
the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA
L. REV . 115, 127 (2009) (discussing how a bank’s “specialized monitoring abilities make it the
low-cost monitor, and because the borrower and creditors, as a group, care about minimizing
total monitoring costs, the borrower willingly grants covenant protections to the bank that it
may not grant other creditors” (footnote omitted)).
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agents are entering risky home mortgages or car leases. 101 Think of the many
constituents of the firm who rely upon its assets and in some way become its
creditors: employees, suppliers of inputs, lenders of debt financing, longterm purchasers. These individuals, due to their lines of business, will often
have natural expertise in the business of their contractual counterparty. 102
The associates of a law firm will have a keen knowledge of its business reputation, its clients will have potentially litigated many cases with the firm, its
debt creditors may have made the firm many loans, and the other law firms
in its malpractice insurance cooperative will have had a longstanding relationship with it. None of these constituents will have any reason to have developed an expertise in consumer lending to a business’s agents. Conversely,
consumer credit lenders possess specialized skills for appraising individuals’
assets and risks, while finding themselves bewildered by a 10-K. 103 Principal
and agent shielding empower the firms’ and agents’ creditors to specialize in
the asset pools in which they are expert. 104 As a result, the cost of credit for
both agents and firms is lower.
It might be objected that eliminating agent shielding could not possibly
lower the cost of capital for a business enterprise. After all, when agents are
jointly liable for a firm’s debts, the asset pool of the corporation remains—
more assets are simply added to it in the form of the agents’ personal assets.
Even in a worst-case scenario, where the agents have difficult-to-appraise assets and risks, the firm’s creditors still have the firm’s pool of assets available
to secure any contracts.
To see why this appealing objection is mistaken, we need to recall how
individuals respond to risk, which is that no one puts their assets at risk
without demanding compensation. 105 Thus, if creditors of a bankrupt busi101 . Cf . REINIER K RAAKMAN ET AL., T HE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 9 (3d ed.
2017) (“[C]reditors of the firm commonly have a comparative advantage in evaluating and
monitoring the value of the firm’s assets . . . .”).
102 . See Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of
Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 V AND. L. REV . 1485, 1502 (1993) (“[C]ommercial lenders usually specialize in providing funds to companies in certain industries. Their knowledge of the
trends and developments in the corporate debtor’s particular industry enables them to evaluate
and monitor the firm’s major decisions, such as opening new plants or manufacturing new
product lines. Indeed, these lenders have ready access to information regarding a debtor corporation and its business associates . . . . [T]hese creditors have the expertise to appraise both
the firm-specific and industry-specific risks (such as the adequacy of the corporate borrower’s
financial ratios) and to negotiate tailor-made provisions to protect their own interests.” (footnote omitted)).
103 . See William M. Clark, An Economic Analysis of the Oklahoma Installment Loan Industry, 60 CONSUMER FIN . L.Q. REP. 487, 488 (2006) (discussing specialization among consumer credit lenders).
104. Empirical evidence suggests that the information costs associated with acquiring
new monitoring expertise can be a significant burden on the cost of capital for a corporation.
See Robert C. Merton, A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information, 42 J. FIN. 483, 484–85 (1987) (analyzing the consequences of the fixed costs creditors
face in acquiring a baseline understanding of a firm on its cost of capital).
105. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 59, at 1159; Posner, supra note 59, at 501–07.
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ness could levy upon the assets of its agents, then those agents would demand compensation for these new (and potentially very significant) risks. 106
The firm would need to compensate the agents for their exposure. 107 In looking for new funds, the firm would turn to the creditors who benefit from the
elimination of agent shielding and seek a lower cost of capital from them,
which it could pass on to its agents. Firm creditors, though, will not be able
to lower the price of the credit they lend to the firm by anything like the
amount the agents demand, because the firm’s creditors will not have the
requisite expertise to cost-effectively price the assets and risks of all the individual agents of the firm. 108 The agents will likewise face a higher cost of
credit from all their personal creditors given their exposure to business risks,
and again, those personal creditors will lack expertise to properly assess the
firm’s assets. 109 The firm’s creditors will not be able to deliver lower credit to
match the increased cost of personal credit and vice versa, because while
each type of creditor previously could specialize in the asset pool in which it
possessed an advantage, both of those advantages have now been hugely diluted. To put the point slightly differently, ceteris paribus, firms that partition assets will in the long run outperform firms that do not because firms
that separate their asset pools will enable specialized creditors to lend in a
way that empowers them to utilize their comparative expertise. 110
2.

Economies of Risk Bearing and Decisionmaking

For a variety of reasons, agents are poorly suited to bear the risks associated with business enterprise. For instance, unlike the shareholders of a publicly traded firm, it is difficult, if not impossible, for agents to be welldiversified as to the businesses of which they are agents. 111 This is both be106 . Cf . Posner, supra note 59, at 505.
107. As the Supreme Court has put it, “an objective economic analysis would suggest the
debtor’s interest payments will adequately compensate all such creditors for the time value of
their money and the risk of default.” Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477 (2004).
108 . See supra notes 61–63, 100–102 and accompanying text.
109 . See supra notes 61–63, 103.
110. This parallels why Posner identified that limited liability benefits not only the creditors of individual shareholders but also the creditors of the corporation. See Posner, supra note
59, at 516–17. Shareholders of a corporation will not expose their personal wealth to the vagaries of the corporation’s fortunes without extracting adequate compensation. A corporation’s
creditors, however, are ill-suited to provide that compensation. For, while they are likely to
have a comparative advantage in assessing the value of corporate assets and the credit risks a
business faces, they are unlikely to possess those same advantages for assessing the individual
shareholders’ assets. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI . L. REV. 89, 100 (1985).
111. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 110, at 107 (“Human capital . . . is notoriously
difficult to diversify. Managers who have firm-specific investments of human capital cannot
diversify the risk of business failure. . . . The possibility of bankruptcy also represents a real cost
to those with firm-specific investments of human capital, and firms must compensate those
who bear this risk.”); Book Note, Stakeholders as Shareholders, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1150, 1153
(1996) (reviewing MARGARET M. BLAIR, OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: RETHINKING CORPORATE
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cause an individual typically holds only one full-time position at a given
moment and because agents are already overinvested in their employer firm
because of the substantial human capital investment typically made in an
employer. 112
Consider some of the other difficulties resulting from the elimination of
only agent shielding. Agents would be jointly bound by the contracts they
enter. Joint liability for contracts would significantly alter the managerial environment. If agents were jointly bound by only the contracts they individually entered, then managers would jockey to avoid being the agent ordered to
enter a given, significant contract. Even if all a firm’s agents were jointly
bound by the contracts the firm enters, inefficiencies would be introduced.
Imagine that a firm’s board of directors were all personally liable for the
firm’s contracts. The directors would undergo differing impacts based on
their assets. For instance, those agents with an enormous amount at stake
might be significantly less (or more) willing to enter a risky contract. Agent
shielding homogenizes the interests of agents. 113 Thus, it facilitates management that is focused on a firm’s economic prospects, rather than the potential impact of firm decisions on the net worth of agents as individuals. 114
Agent and principal shielding also have the advantage of making the
wealth of individual agents largely irrelevant to hiring decisions. If there
were no principal shielding, then the owners and agents of a firm would seek
wealthier agents, as those agents’ personal net worth would lower the firm’s
cost of capital. Indeed, the firm’s marginal likelihood of insolvency would
decrease with the employment of wealthier agents. For instance, it might become desirable to hire a CEO whose competence was inferior to another
candidate but whose net worth was substantial because creditors would be
willing to lend to the firm for less, given the increase in the pool of its assets. 115 Agency law compartmentalizes a manager’s human capital off from
their financial capital.

GOVERNANCE FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995)) (“[T]he human capital of employees
is unique to the firm and is thus much more difficult to diversify.”).
112. Rafael Gely & Leonard Bierman, The Law and Economics of Employee Information
Exchange in the Knowledge Economy, 12 G EO. M ASON L. R EV. 651, 674 (2004) (“[E]mployees
have a fairly limited ability to diversify their human capital portfolio. . . . [I]t is much more difficult to spread one’s human capital among different projects or functions than it is for the
owners of capital to diversify their wealth among a wide variety of investments.” (footnote
omitted)); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. R EV. 121, 124
(1991) (“Employees . . . have all their human capital invested in a single employer.”).
113. The fear of bankruptcy and job loss alone likely is a major distraction to corporate
managers. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425, 453–54 (1997).
114 . Cf . Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 424 (making the analogous point that
decisionmaking by firm owners is greatly eased by limited liability).
115. This is similar to limited liability. If there were no limited liability, then owners of a
firm would seek wealthier co-owners, as their personal net worth would lower the firm’s cost of
capital. See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 M D. L. REV .
80, 106 (1991) (“[Limited liability] serves important functions in closely held firms, includ-
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Incentives

The Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire analysis of asset partitioning—
and most of the literature that follows it—has emphasized that asset partitioning creates benefits because of how it empowers actors outside the firm,
especially creditors. Thinking of the partitions between a firm and its managers, however, foregrounds a different dimension of asset partitioning: its
complex effects on the incentives of managers and firms. Fully exploring this
issue is beyond the scope of this Article, but I will briefly survey some of the
most prominent considerations.
Consider a legal system without agent shielding, in which agents were
jointly liable for a firm’s contracts. On one hand, a central problem of firm
governance—the agency problem—would probably actually be reduced. After all, in the close corporation setting, firm manager-owners sometimes personally guarantee corporate debt and, when doing so, presumably exercise a
level of competence and caution in negotiating those contracts similar to
when they enter personal debts. On the other hand, exercising that level of
caution, when it comes to firm debts as massive as large businesses incur,
would almost certainly induce a level of risk aversion that would make the
healthy contractual functioning of firms impossible. Making agents personally liable would go far beyond restoring agents’ normal incentive structure,
but would produce bizarrely outsized incentives by exposing the agent directly to the liabilities of the principal. That is, firm managers would have
extremely strong incentives to exercise care when entering corporate contracts, but that level of care—or at least the level of risk aversion reflected in
it—would likely be excessive in comparison to a risk-neutral firm’s preferences. Principal shielding thus frees firms to carefully tailor the incentives to
which an agent is exposed.
Consider then a system without principal shielding, in which firms were
co-liable for the debts of their managers. Here, managers would be able to
externalize a substantial part of the cost of credit. The likely effect would be
that managers would be willing to enter contracts and incur debts that are
excessive from a social perspective.
The effect of all of this is a provisional conclusion that the case for partitioning off the assets of managers and firms is in fact considerably stronger
than the case for partitioning off the assets of owners and firms. This is reflected in an observation Hansmann and Kraakman make when they briefly
consider asset partitioning and management. They note that in “nearly all
standard-form legal entities,” the asset partitions “with respect to managers
follow a rule of exclusivity: The firm’s assets are not available to satisfy the
manager’s personal obligations, and the manager’s personal assets are not
available to satisfy the firm’s obligations.” 116

ing . . . reducing creditors’ need to monitor shareholder wealth.”); see also Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 110, at 95; Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 424.
116. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 398.
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III. AGENCY LAW IS ESSENTIAL TO ASSET PARTITIONING
Much of agency law’s contribution to commerce consists of simply
providing default terms around which parties can freely contract. 117 Agency
thus acts like a standard-form contract providing off-the-rack terms to govern the relationships among firms, their managers, and third parties. In serving this role, agency is haunted by the same charge that has confronted
corporate law for decades—whether it is in fact “trivial.” 118 Bernard Black
sharply posed this question, asking whether corporate law actually mattered
if all it did was provide parties with an initial set of contract terms that they
were free to cheaply circumvent. 119 “The conventional wisdom” became that
“[m]ost of the provisions in business corporation statutes [were] just default
rules,” and as a result, inconsequential, because parties could alter or waive
them at low cost. 120 This charge of triviality not only threatens the independent integrity of a body of law, by asking whether it is merely a form of contract, but also threatens its significance to commercial outcomes. If all a set
of doctrines do is provide easily altered defaults, then they may be unlikely to
seriously affect the results that sophisticated parties reach. This Part argues
that agency law is “essential” in a way that answers this charge of triviality.
Agency law serves functions that parties could not feasibly attain through
contract—functions that are profoundly important to the efficiency of commercial enterprise: namely, its attribution and asset partitioning rules. 121
The essential intuition for why the attribution rules of agency could not
be established by contract is simple but profound: agency allows contracting
with strangers. This function of agency could not be accomplished by contract because it involves coordinating parties’ expectations as to whether to
contract and bond themselves with others with whom they have no preexisting or ongoing relationship.

117 . See Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. R EV. 355, 428 (2002) (“Agency laws provide gap fillers where
contractual definitions of agents’ and principals’ legal relationships are incomplete.”); Simpson, supra note 7, at 1164; Douglas M. Nevin, Comment, No Business like Show Business: Copyright Law, the Theatre Industry, and the Dilemma of Rewarding Collaboration, 53 EMORY L.J.
1533, 1566 n.204 (2004) (“[I]n most contract and agency law, traditional solutions serve as default provisions that only take effect when the parties remain silent on the issue.”).
118. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
N W . U. L. REV. 542 (1990). Black’s challenge spawned a significant literature in corporate law.
See, e .g ., Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J.
2032, 2113 (2012) (“Bernie Black famously described corporate law defaults as ‘trivial’ because
corporations could so easily opt out that the legal choice of default had in equilibrium no impact on the substantive choices of corporations.”); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate
Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 827 (1995) (discussing Black’s thesis);
Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L. R EV. 608,
613 (1998).
119. Black, supra note 118, at 551–52.
120. Henry Hansmann, Corporation and Contract, 8 A M. L. & E CON. REV. 1, 1 (2006).
121 . See supra Section II.C.
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There are a number of features to the asset partitioning arrangement established by agency law. They will be considered as individual components
because while the law is essential to establishing some, others could be replicated through contract.
A. Principal and Agent Shielding
Both the asset partitioning arrangement and the attribution rules agency
law creates could not be established by contract. I will offer an argument for
each of these conclusions. The first shows the infeasibility of a firm replicating principal shielding by contract in the face of a default rule that personal
creditors of an agent could levy upon the assets of his firm. 122 The second argument is essentially that workable attribution rules require a doctrine like
apparent authority. 123 Some variant of apparent authority is necessary in order to avoid inefficiently burdening third parties, simply because if principals were shielded from any agent contract that they did not actually
authorize, third parties would effectively have to verify every contract with
the principal herself.
1.

Why Law Is Essential

The first argument is based on the transaction cost and moral hazard
problems a firm would face in attempting to replicate principal shielding
contractually. 124 Imagine there was no principal shielding. A typical large
firm attempting to establish principal shielding itself would confront a default rule that managers’ personal creditors could levy on the firm’s assets in
the event a manager breached a contractual obligation. To establish principal
shielding, the firm would have to require every manager to include relevant
language requiring the counterparty to waive recourse against the firm in
every contract the manager entered with anyone. The firm could draft, at
moderate expense, standard language providing for this, which could then
be imparted to agents. 125 The agents themselves, however, would face substantial transaction costs in negotiating the inclusion of this term with every
contractual counterparty they encountered. 126 The transaction costs of this
alone would be significant.
There is another and more severe problem involved, however, stemming
from a firm’s need to monitor whether its agents are including these waivers:

122 . See infra notes 124–128 and accompanying text.
123 . See infra notes 129–131 and accompanying text.
124. The explanation offered here applies the insights of Hansmann and Kraakman on
entity shielding, which principal shielding parallels in these respects. Hansmann & Kraakman,
supra note 14, at 812–14.
125 . See Charles K. Whitehead, Destructive Coordination, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 323, 326
(2011) (discussing how “[s]tandard-form contracts . . . lower the expense of negotiating deals”
for repeat players).
126 . See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 14, at 813.
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if a manager can contractually bind the firm for which he works, a significant moral hazard is created. A manager can always lower his cost of credit
by not including a nonrecourse waiver as to the firm, thus implicitly pledging its assets as well as his own. 127 The attempt to monitor every manager for
such activity due to the constant threat of opportunism would be enormously costly for a firm. Monitoring each of the managers in a large commercial
enterprise for every contract they personally entered would undo much of
the benefit of deploying agents in the first place. 128 The combined costs of
trying to circumvent both the transaction cost and moral hazard problems
would almost certainly render this impracticable. Thus, the law of agency
makes an essential contribution to commercial firms by establishing principal shielding.
There is a second argument for the necessary contribution of agency
law, which focuses on the need for apparent authority and its provision
through law. Assume principal shielding is in place. Unlike with entity
shielding, the story cannot end here. For unlike with the owners of a firm,
the fundamental point of having directors, CEOs, managers, and other
agents is so that they can sometimes legally bind the firm. 129 Agency law
must thus grapple with defining which—and when—agents can bind a
firm. 130
The problem necessitating law’s role is that a firm must identify to third
parties exactly who has the legal power to act on the firm’s behalf, whether in
buying and selling assets, entering contracts, or bringing and defending suit.
This is because third parties will interact with agents who will persuade a
third party to contract with them while giving the faulty impression—
whether from opportunism or simple error—that the principal authorized
the contract. 131 If actual authorization by the principal (say, the board) were

127 . Id . at 812 (observing that, in the absence of entity shielding, the owners of a firm
“have both the ability and the incentive to explicitly or implicitly pledge the firm[’s] assets to
support their individual activities (including their other business investments)”).
128 . Cf . Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 408 (discussing why a firm cannot
monitor its owner’s personal contracting and noting that “in order for the entrepreneur’s business creditors to have faith in the entrepreneur’s compliance with his promise to give them
priority in his business assets, they would have to engage in continuous monitoring of the entrepreneur’s contracts with all of his individual creditors—a task that generally would be infeasible”).
129 . See LaCosta v. McCalla Raymer, LLC, No. 1:10-CV-1171-RWS, 2011 WL 166902, at
*4 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 18, 2011) (“[T]he underlying premise of agency law [is] that a principal has
the power to appoint someone to act on his behalf.”).
130. This argument owes much to John Armour and Michael Whincop’s work on apparent authority. See Armour & Whincop, supra note 44, at 441–42; see also KRAAKMAN ET AL.,
supra note 101, at 7 & n.22, 11 & n.40.
131. The opposite situation is also a danger, in which the principal does secretly authorize an agent, but when a deal goes sour, conspires with the agent to claim his action was unauthorized. See, e .g ., PanAmerican Operating, Inc., v. Maud Smith Estate, 409 S.W.3d 168, 175
(Tex. App. 2013) (“This case, on the other hand, is about a principal who employs an agent to
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necessary for a contract to be binding on a firm, then much of the value of
deploying agents would be undone, as third parties would have to check with
the ultimate authority of the firm as to a contract’s authorization in every instance to be sure the contract bound the firm.
Third parties would incur prohibitive transaction costs if they had to inquire with the principal as to the agent’s authority for every contract. 132 Imagine if, to rent a car at Hertz, you had to contact the board of directors or
CEO because nothing short of their assurance was necessary for the contract
you signed with a purported Hertz agent to be binding. This is exactly what
would be necessary if the allocation of a firm’s authority were determined by
the agreements among intra-firm parties. Principal shielding would be prohibitively costly for third parties if there were no liability at all without principal consent and principals were only liable for those precise contracts they
actually authorized. 133 In other words, an essential way in which agency law
sustains attribution rules is by defining some alternative to actual authority
so third parties can rely on contracts they enter with agents binding the
principal without having to verify the contract with the principal herself.
Agency solves this problem by putting third parties on general notice that,
under certain conditions, a principal will be bound by unauthorized contracts (i.e., apparent authority where a reasonable third party would believe
the contract to be binding based on the principal’s manifestations). 134
A reasonable reader might object, however, that firms should be able to
develop contractual technologies that make it unreasonable ex ante for insiders to implicitly commit firm capital by entering contracts binding on the
firm as well. Couldn’t both entity shielding and principal shielding be
achieved without “law” because the firm could simply require all owners and
managers to always include a no-recourse-to-firm-assets provision in any
personal contract? The first thing to note is that the clause in the contract
between the firm and its manager would not be binding on third parties. The
agent or owner could defect and offer the firm’s assets to third parties. The
agent would be in breach of contract, but that would be of little help to a firm
not bound to a contract it wished to avoid. Second, the threat of sanction is
only as good as the firm’s ability to detect breach. Any sanction could thus
only succeed if the firm credibly commits to successfully monitoring agents
for committing firm resources. Thus, sanctions require the kind of monitoring that is prohibitively costly in the first place.
A firm could avoid having to rely on sanctions, however, if it simply
demanded that agents compensate the firm ex ante for any ex post breach of

carry out its business but, regretting the outcome of the agent’s actions, opportunistically denies the agent acted with authority.”).
132. Armour & Whincop, supra note 44, at 445.
133. An attempt to solve this problem through further representations by agents themselves simply creates a regress because, in the absence of principal piercing, third parties cannot rely on those representations to bind the principal.
134 . See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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the agent’s contract to not commit firm assets to personal contracts. For instance, a firm could insist that any agent post a bond sufficient to cover any
pledge of firm assets. Such a bond is unrealistic, though. Firms are routinely
large-scale and capital intensive, while almost all agents are capital constrained and have insufficient assets to post a bond that could actually compensate the firm. Even where it was realistic, using such bonds would undeundesirably distort the labor market for agents by making high-wealth
agents more desirable than low-wealth agents, regardless of skill, because of
their superior ability to post a bond. Nonetheless, this objection does highlight that the difference between an “essential” and inessential role of agency
law (or organizational law for that matter)—between what contract can and
cannot accomplish in structuring voluntary cooperation—is a difference of
degree and not kind.
2.

How Doctrine Reflects Agency Law’s Essential Role

The argument of the last Section concluded that there are important
commercial efficiencies that depend upon the law providing for when a
principal will and will not be bound by the contracts entered by its agents. In
particular, third parties benefit enormously from stable expectations concerning when a firm will be bound by unauthorized contracts entered by its
agents. The argument concerning attribution rules and apparent authority
leads to an expectation about how legal doctrine should look. Namely, the
law should provide mandatory apparent authority rules, rather than merely
leaving it to firms to decide the body of law that will govern when they will
be bound by unauthorized contracts. Whatever body of law an individual
firm chose, enabling firms to freely choose the authority rules governing
them would create enormous confusion for third parties who would have to
concern themselves with learning firm-specific agency principles. Unlike
stock, which is issued only periodically and on the primary market to generally sophisticated parties, agents interact continuously and with a wide range
of parties, all of whom would now need to worry about the firm’s particular
agency rules.
Mandatory rules for authority are exactly what are observed in legal doctrine. While a firm is typically given enormous latitude over the body of law
that governs the allocation of authority among its owners and managers, this
is not true when it comes to the rules governing when a firm will be bound
by an unauthorized contract entered by its agent with a third party. When
decisions solely affect intra-firm matters, they are almost exclusively left to
the firm to decide. 135 Not so when a firm’s allocation of decisionmaking
rights affects third parties, however.
The body of law governing the allocation of authority over internal firm
matters is called “internal affairs doctrine.” The internal affairs doctrine governs most of how a firm divides up control over its business. Internal affairs

135 .

See infra notes 136–139 and accompanying text.
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doctrine provides that the law of a corporation’s state of incorporation governs the relationships among its managers, shareholders, and the firm itself. 136 Because firms can freely choose the state of their incorporation, the
internal affairs doctrine leads to firms generally being free to choose the
body of law that regulates their internal operations and managerial hierarchy. 137 This led scholar Larry Ribstein to note that because of internal affairs
doctrine, “firms can avoid organization law simply by choosing their state of
organization. . . . [I]n such a system, organization law has less influence in
shaping firms . . . .” 138 Ribstein took this to be “consistent with Bernard
Black’s thesis that even apparently mandatory business organization rules
are ‘trivial’ ” because parties can avoid rules they dislike through simply contracting around them by choice of state of incorporation. 139
This is certainly not true when it comes to how a firm allocates the authority to bind it among its agents. For whether an agent effectively exercises
decision rights over a firm’s contracts and property is determined by the
rules of agency law, such as apparent authority, and crucially, firms cannot
choose the body of agency law that governs them. 140 As one case put it, “questions relating to the internal affairs of corporations are decided in accordance with the law of the place of incorporation,” but the “issue of apparent
authority is governed by the law where [the plaintiff] ‘relied upon such apparent authority.’ ” 141 Regardless of what state a corporation chooses for its
organizational law, whether contracts entered by an agent bind the firm,
even if they are unauthorized, will be determined by the law of the state in
which the firm’s agents actually do their business. The bottom line is that a
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 304, 307 (AM. LAW INST. 1971).
137. Exceptions exist where federal law imposes substantive corporate governance requirements on firms, though even in light of Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank, these remain
relatively limited. See MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
1–2, 6 (2018); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1524 (2005) (providing an overview of many of the controversial substantive provisions of the statute).
138. Larry E. Ribstein, The Important Role of Non-Organization Law, 40 WAKE FOREST
L. REV . 751, 753 (2005) (emphasis omitted).
139 . Id .
140 . See, e .g ., Trip Mate, Inc. v. Stonebridge Cas. Ins. Co., No. 10-0793-CV-W-ODS,
2013 WL 1628502, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 2013), (“Apparent authority and agency by
estoppel depend on representations made to [the third party], so the . . . choice of law provision [in the contract between principal and agent] should not govern.”), rev’d and remanded,
768 F.3d 779 (8th Cir. 2014).
141. Lehman Bros. v. Tutelar CIA Financiera, S.A., No. 95 CIV. 3772 (DLC), 1997 WL
403463, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1997) (quoting Scottish Air Int’l, Inc. v. British Caledonian
Grp., PLC, 81 F.3d 1224, 1234 (2d Cir. 1996)); see also M. Lowenstein & Sons v. British-Am.
Mfg. Co., 300 F. 853, 855 (D. Conn. 1924), rev’d on other grounds, 7 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1925); In
re Total Containment, Inc., No. 04-13144BF, 2008 WL 250176, at *14 n.10 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
Jan. 29, 2008) (“The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, § 292 (1971), instructs that a
principal will be bound by its agent’s actions ‘if he would so be bound under the local law of
the state where the agent dealt with the third person. . . .’ ” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 292 (AM. LAW INST. 1971))).
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firm cannot opt out of apparent authority doctrine or choose which state’s
authority rules apply to it.
B. Does Agency Law Serve Other Essential Functions?
I have argued that agency’s role in establishing principal shielding and
attribution rules is an essential function of agency law—“essential” in the
sense of an attribute that could not practicably be replicated by contract in
the absence of agency law. 142 Parties struggling to establish the benefits of
principal shielding on their own would face enormous transaction cost and
moral hazard problems in achieving that goal. 143 The question can be asked,
then, whether there are other essential functions of agency outside of asset
partitioning. After all, aspects of agency law, especially the fiduciary obligations often treated as agency’s core, are the subject of a vast literature. 144 Are
any of the other aspects of agency law features that parties could not replicate through contract?
To offer an answer to this question, I look at the three core sets of agency rules, which address the three major dynamics implicated by the agency
relationship: the duties an agent owes the principal, the duties the principal
owes the agent, and the relationship between principal and agent and third
parties.
1.

The Duties of Agent and Principal

The heart of agency law is often thought to lie in the fiduciary duties that
agency law mandates agents owe their principals. 145 There are several such
duties, including the core duties of loyalty, 146 care, 147 and obedience. 148 As
has been widely observed of such duties, however, they could easily be replicated by contract. 149 These duties boil down to promises made by agents to
act in the principal’s interests—promises that can be put to paper with rela142. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 432.
143 . See supra Section III.A.
144 . See supra note 48; see also Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, Reality Check on Officer
Liability, 67 BUS. LAW . 75, 85–86 (2011) (characterizing agency law as “the body of law traditionally governing th[e] subject” of fiduciary duties); Douglas Zolkind, Note, The Case of the
Missing Shareholders: A New Restriction on Honest Services Fraud in United States v. Brown, 93
CORNELL L. R EV . 437, 461 (2008) (“It is a fundamental principle of agency law that agents owe
fiduciary duties to their principals.”).
145 . See supra notes 136–139 and accompanying text.
146. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
147 . Id . § 8.08.
148 . Id . § 8.09.
149. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 24–25 (1991); see also Aaron D. Jones, Corporate Officer Wrongdoing and the
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Officers Under Delaware Law, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 475, 478 (2007)
(discussing that the rules governing the “principal–agent relationship are defined in the first
instance by agreement, with agency law merely providing certain useful default provisions”).
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tive ease and for which standard-form contracts could be supplied. Indeed,
the fiduciary duties that officers owe the firm are the subject of frequent contractual negotiation. 150 Likewise, the fiduciary duties of directors on a corporate board, which grow out of the law of agency, are often the subject of
extensive contractual negotiation. 151
The doctrine of agency underlines this fact. While agency law provides a
rich array of fiduciary duties, 152 these rules are all—and only—default
rules. 153 The Restatement of Agency expressly renders each one of them waivable by contract. 154 As the Restatement puts it, “[c]onduct by an agent that
would otherwise constitute a breach of duty . . . does not constitute a breach
of duty if the principal consents to the conduct.” 155 Thus, the principal and
agent may modify or eliminate the agent’s fiduciary duties simply by agreement between themselves. 156
That the rules governing the agent’s duties are almost all default rules
does not make them unimportant. There is a significant literature devoted to
analyzing the optimal default rules for contract law. 157 This is because optimizing default rules can make an important efficiency contribution. It does
so by reducing transaction costs, and one important way in which it reduces
150. Sandra K. Miller, The Best of Both Worlds: Default Fiduciary Duties and Contractual
Freedom in Alternative Business Entities, 39 J. CORP. L. 295, 315, 320 (2014).
151 . See, e .g ., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW . U. L. REV. 547, 574–77 (2003) (discussing to whom directors’ fiduciary duties are owed); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700 (1982) (discussing the function of the fiduciary duties of
managers and directors); Gabriel Rauterberg & Eric Talley, Contracting out of the Fiduciary
Duty of Loyalty: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Opportunity Waivers, 177 COLUM . L. REV .
1075 (2017) (discussing statutory changes that empowered parties to contract over the duty of
loyalty).
152 . See G REGORY, supra note 1, at 139–54.
153. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 376 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (“The existence
and extent of the duties of the agent to the principal are determined by the terms of the agreement between the parties . . . .”).
154. In its discussion of the duties the principal and agent owe each other, the Restatement expressly provides that the principal and agent can agree to waive the agent’s duties. See
R ESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06 (AM. LAW INST. 2006). This provision extends to
waiving the duty of loyalty, § 8.01, the duty to not act adversely to the principal in a transaction
connected with the agency relationship, § 8.03, and to not compete with the principal, § 8.04.
Id .; see also DANIEL S. K LEINBERGER , AGENCY, PARTNERSHIPS, AND LLCS : E XAMPLES AND
E XPLANATIONS 175 (5th ed. 2017). In the context of the corporation, corporate officers and
directors sometimes have nonwaivable fiduciary duties, although Delaware LLCs render even
these duties mostly waivable. Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 701, 701–02 (2011); Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of
Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 226 (2011) (“[Mandatory] provisions that are imposed under Delaware corporate law—including the judge-made law of fiduciary duties—may be contractually waived, modified or clarified under Delaware LLC law.”).
155. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06.
156 . Id .
157 . See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 Y ALE L.J. 87, 89–91 (1989).
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those costs is through so-called “majoritarian” defaults, which insert into
contracts the terms that most or all parties would have wanted had they considered the matter. 158 The parties need not analyze, negotiate, and draft those
terms where the law has saved them the work of doing so by inserting them,
unless contrary language is added. Default terms also force those who wish
to change them to do the work of drafting and adding them, which a careful
counterparty will notice. 159 The harder it is to waive a default, such as requiring the detailed and explicit waiver of a default term, the more protection the
law gives the unsophisticated or unwary. Default terms also have the benefit
of enabling a body of rich interpretive precedent to develop, clarifying a provision’s application in a variety of settings. 160
A principal also owes duties to an agent, including, centrally, the duty to
pay the agent’s wages. 161 These duties, like that of the agent to the principal,
can be altered by contract. 162 In fact, while the Restatement offers a lengthy
list of duties an agent owes a principal, a principal’s duty to her agent is
largely confined to “act[ing] in accordance with the express and implied
terms of any contract between the principal and the agent.” 163
2.

The Liability of Principal and Agent to Third Parties

There is an aspect of principal piercing not discussed above that is worth
noting: principal piercing in tort. Tort rules cannot be established by contract because they involve the firm’s impact on involuntary creditors, who
are, almost by definition, strangers to the operations and contracts of a firm
and its agents. 164 The vicarious liability rule whereby a firm is legally held
strictly liable for torts committed by its agents could not be put in place
through the contracting of private parties simply because the parties usually
have no relationship prior to the tort. 165

158. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 149, at 702.
159 . See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 157, at 90–92.
160 . See, e .g ., Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers
Should Be Fiduciaries, 87 W ASH . L. REV. 707, 775 (2012) (noting how “default rules governing
fiduciary relationships” benefit from having “developed through centuries of precedent in the
common law”).
161 . See K LEINBERGER , supra note 154, at 158–61.
162 . See id . at 147; see also Jones, supra note 149, at 484 (“Nothing in agency law presents
any limits on the parties’ ability to alter the legal obligations that they owe each other.”);
Charles Silver, Merging Roles: Mass Tort Lawyers as Agents and Trustees, 31 PEPP. L. R EV. 301,
321 (2003) (“Agency law gives principals and agents complete freedom to modify its default
provisions.”).
163. RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.13 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
164 . See infra Section IV.A.
165. Vicarious liability will be discussed in more detail infra Section IV.A.
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C. Agency Outside the Firm
So far, this Article has focused on agency relationships between legal entities and the individuals who are authorized to act on their behalf as their
agents. Because virtually all large-scale productive enterprises are organized
in one or more legal entities, this is probably the most important environment in which agents operate in the modern economy. It is also one, however, that emphasizes the similarities between agency law and entity law, and in
particular, between entity shielding and principal shielding. Indeed, for reasons that will be discussed shortly, in early stage business enterprises, owners
are routinely also managers, collapsing the distinction between the providers
of human and financial capital. Thus, it is worth considering what roles
agency law serves that contract could not feasibly replicate outside the context of the firm. After all, the “naked” principal–agent relationship between
two natural persons is a strong candidate for the protean, original form of
agency. Thus, while the most important agents for the purpose of commerce
may be agents of entities, agency relationships among humans remain both
conceptually and practically important. In this Section, I first discuss how in
many primordial business entities, asset partitioning for managers and owners converge. I then discuss the essential roles of agency in the natural person–natural person agency setting.
1.

Convergence Between Manager and Owner Partitioning

In a large public corporation, shareholders are typically uninvolved in
the corporation’s affairs, generating the famous “separation of ownership
and control” and distinct roles for owners and managers. 166 In many business forms, however, this is not the case, and owners also play a managerial
role, acting as agents of the firm. This is the case with partnerships, 167 as well
as with many LLCs, closely held corporations, and solely owned corporations. 168 Indeed, this is true even in public corporations with controlling
shareholders, as they typically play a managerial role as well. 169 In these situations, where ownership and control are not separated and are sometimes
vested in exactly the same persons, the relationships among the various
forms of asset partitioning are complex.

166. ADOLF A. BERLE , J R . & G ARDINER C. M EANS, T HE M ODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 119 (1933); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & E CON. 301, 312, 317–18 (1983).
167. Fama & Jensen, supra note 166, at 307.
168 . Id .; Andrew A. Lewis, Small Business Toolkit for Probate and Estate Planning Attorneys, 6 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 279, 297–98 (2014).
169 . See Lewis, supra note 168, at 297–98 (“It is most common for limited partnerships to
be managed by a general partner who is an owner of the partnership; for LLCs to be managed
by either managers or members who are owners of the LLC; and for small corporations to have
a board of directors and officers who are also owners of the corporation.”).
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Consider the partnership as an illustration. For centuries, the partnership was the principal multiowner business form for commercial activity in
the developed world. 170 But in the partnership, entity shielding and principal
shielding overlap because the partners of a partnership are owner-agents. A
general partnership exists where two or more persons join together to carry
on a business for profit as co-owners. 171 Each partner presumptively has a
right to comanage the partnership’s affairs, and each partner has the power
to bind the partnership through acts that are in its usual course of business. 172 Each partner is thus also an agent of the partnership. 173 A partner is
consequently both an owner and a manager of a partnership, with a right
both to share in the partnership’s profits and to bind it as its agent. 174 As one
treatise puts it, “ownership and control are identical in the common law
partnership.” 175 In such a situation, entity shielding and principal shielding
overlap because a personal creditor of a partner is by definition a personal
creditor both of an owner and of an agent of the partnership. A legal system
that attempted to accomplish entity shielding in the partnership without
principal shielding would quickly collapse, for the personal creditors of the
partnership’s owners are also the personal creditors of its managers. Indeed,
the overlap in roles is presumably a reason why creditors of the partnership
or partners would have felt particularly entitled to proceed against the assets
of all individuals involved. 176

170. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 439 (“Prior to the advent of the investorowned business corporation, which is largely a creature of the past two centuries, partnership
was the form commonly used for jointly owned businesses.”); Warren H. Johnson, Limited
Liability Companies (LLC): Is the LLC Liability Shield Holding Up Under Judicial Scrutiny?, 35
N EW E NG . L. R EV. 177, 182 (2000) (“The privately-owned, for-profit business corporation
came into existence only within the last few centuries and until the mid-1800s most business
was conducted by proprietorships and partnerships.”); Myron T. Steele, Essay, The Moral Underpinnings of Delaware’s Modern Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 26 N OTRE DAME J.L. E THICS &
PUB. POL’ Y 3, 17 (2012) (“For centuries, partnerships were favored forms of business, and
people generally organized corporations only for public or charitable purposes.”).
171 . See KLEINBERGER, supra note 154, at 215, 220. Many of partnership’s most basic
principles stretch back for more than half a millennium to the Middle Ages. See W ILLIAM A.
G REGORY & THOMAS R. HURST , AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP AND OTHER FORMS OF
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 362 (1994).
172 . See G REGORY & H URST, supra note 171, at 363 (“Each partner is the agent of the
partnership and has the power to bind the partnership in the ordinary conduct of its business
affairs.”); K LEINBERGER , supra note 154, at 215, 220.
173. GREGORY & HURST, supra note 171, at 363; KLEINBERGER, supra note 154, at 220.
174. GREGORY & HURST, supra note 171, at 363; KLEINBERGER, supra note 154, at 220.
175 . See G REGORY & H URST, supra note 171, at 363. Economists have carefully studied
the efficiencies, in certain contexts, of putting ownership claims in the hands of those managing the firm. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims,
26 J.L. & E CON. 327, 333 (1983).
176. A historical note is in order here. It may be intuitive to view principal shielding as
an extension of entity shielding, but as a historical and conceptual matter, the opposite may be
true. Entity shielding may have grown out of principal shielding. Entity shielding first developed in the industrialized West in the partnership and then continued on as an attribute of the
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Agency Outside Entities

What essential roles does agency law serve outside the setting of the
firm? This Article has identified three essential roles for agency law: attribution rules, reflected in authority doctrine; asset partitioning of firms and
managers; and vicarious liability. Vicarious liability clearly remains a necessary creature of law. Even the tort victim of an agent who acts on behalf of a
sole proprietor has no relationship with the principal and requires legal doctrine to impose a regime of strict liability on the principal. Again, because
tort victims typically have no preexisting relationship with the tortfeasor,
contract could not practicably replace vicarious liability.
The attribution rules also remain a necessary contribution of law. The
key function of authority doctrine is to coordinate the expectations of two
parties that remain strangers—the principal and third party—as to the liability of each to the other. By definition, the third party does not personally ver-

corporation. See Hansmann et al., supra note 13, at 1381–87. But in the partnership, entity
shielding was born out of the logic of principal shielding—the logic that bars a personal creditor of an agent from seizing the assets of his principal. The easiest way to see this is to look at
the early U.S. cases first adopting entity shielding and to examine their justification for doing
so. The leading case is an opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court written by Justice Story. N. Rogers & Sons v. Batchelor, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 221, 229–30 (1838). Story was the early Court’s keenest student of agency and partnership law and, having written the seminal treatises on the
subject, was the likeliest justice to offer an in-depth explanation of the Court’s reasoning in
endorsing entity shielding. J OSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON E QUITY J URISPRUDENCE
(Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1839); JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF PARTNERSHIP (Boston, Charles C. Little & James Brown 1846). Story was confronted with a case that squarely raised the central question of entity shielding—“whether the
funds of a partnership [could] be rightfully applied” to pay the “separate pre-existing debt” of
an individual partner. Story provided the crucial answer, but his explanation was especially
illuminating:
We are of opinion in the negative on [this] question. The implied authority of each
partner to dispose of the partnership funds strictly and rightfully extends only to the
business and transactions of the partnership itself; and any disposition of those funds,
by any partner, beyond such purposes, is an excess of his authority as partner.

N . Rogers & Sons, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 229–30 (emphases added). The reasoning here is clearly
an application of principal shielding to a situation in which an agent is also an owner, as in the
partnership. A partner cannot pay an individual debt with partnership funds, nor can his
creditor levy on the partnership’s assets, as “the separate creditor can have no better title to the
funds than the partner himself had.” Id . at 230. In justifying entity shielding, the logic of the
Court was that of principal shielding. Individual creditors of partners have no right to the assets of the partnership itself because each partner only has an agent’s rights to the assets of the
partnership. An unauthorized agent cannot bind the principal—the partnership here—even if
that agent happens to be an owner. More specifically, it is beyond the authority conferred on a
partner by the rules of agency law that a partner be able to use partnership assets as security for
his personal contracts. Entity shielding, which bars partners’ personal creditors from being
able to seize partnership assets, is thus founded in the logic of principal shielding, at least in the
United States.
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ify the actual authority of the agent with the principal. 177 If the third party
could, then it could contract directly with the principal instead.
But what about the asset partitioning role of agency law? Here, a reasonable reader may object that simply because one natural person acts on another’s behalf does not require any rule of law to keep the assets of each
person as a separate pool. Put another way, the agency relationship does not
shift a reasonable claimant’s expectations of whose assets are available to him
as a creditor such that agency law must partition the agent’s and principal’s
assets. So, for instance, the personal mortgagor of an agent would not be
tempted to sue a principal simply because the agent possessed authority to
sometimes contractually bind the principal in wholly unrelated matters. This
worry raises deep issues, although I believe it is ultimately mistaken. The
problem is that the law’s provision of an asset partitioning arrangement is
deceptively self-evident in the agency relationship. In general, the asset partitioning literature identifies the legal separation of asset pools as an asset partition when in the absence of legal intervention creditors would reasonably
seek to levy on the assets of one pool in order to satisfy claims against the
other. 178 And while, as the cases above illustrate, reasonable creditors could
certainly be tempted to levy on the assets of a controlling manager to satisfy
claims against a firm, it is less plausible that creditors would seek to empty
the pockets of a vast number of small passive creditors in a public company.
Nonetheless, this objection can easily be taken too far. Even without including a firm, there are certainly situations in which personal creditors of
one of several parties—say, the agent—who are involved in joint economic
activity in the form of an agency relationship would be reasonably tempted
to seek compensation from the principal. To illustrate, I will draw on a venerable old British case, Twyne’s Case, 179 which is often considered a font of
fraudulent conveyance law. 180 In Twyne’s Case, a farmer named Pierce
claimed to have sold his sheep to Twyne. 181 However, Pierce continued to
retain possession of the sheep, care for them, and seemingly treat them identically as his own. 182 In a subsequent dispute, the court found the putative
transfer of sheep voidable. 183 The case is famous because it illustrates vividly
the difficulties creditors face as soon as the individual managing assets no
longer owns them. Creditors must worry that a debtor is trying to obtain

177. Under U.S. law, in a very technical sense it is not possible for the third party to verify the actual authority of an agent with the third party. Actual authority depends on the reasonable belief of the agent that the principal had conferred authority on the agent to so act.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
178 . See, e .g ., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 390.
179. Twyne’s Case (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 809; 3 Co. Rep. 80 b.
180 . See, e .g ., Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Information, Uncertainty, and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 302 (1984).
181 . Twyne’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. at 811.
182 . Id .
183 . Id . at 823.
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cheaper credit by purporting to own assets that the debtor does not own.
Knowing that “creditors will charge debtors for that risk, a debtor wants a
way of assuring such creditors that he in fact has the right to sell or offer as
collateral what he says he does.” 184 The point, for my purposes, is a simple
one. The joint economic activity of two natural persons, in which one person
manages another’s affairs and can sometimes bind them contractually, can
quite quickly muddle third parties’ understanding of whose assets belong to
whom. Those uncertain expectations, when reasonable, mean that the law
will have to play a role in coordinating third parties’ expectations as to which
assets will be available to satisfy which claims. The agency relationship confuses the normative baseline so as to make legal resolution necessary, even in
the agency relationship.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
The account of agency law offered here has far-reaching normative and
doctrinal implications. It explains the powerful efficiency advantages of
agency law for third parties, illuminates the basic purposes and contours of
agency doctrine, and provides several ways in which we can usefully reform
that doctrine.
A. Contract Versus Tort
One basic insight suggested by an asset partitioning account is how to
make sense of the difference between the attribution rules governing the application of agency in contract and in tort. Contract and tort are agency law’s
two principal tributaries. Even a superficial reading of the Restatements of
Agency indicates that these are the two bodies of private law in which agency
principles are most consequential. 185 In many respects, agency treats them
identically. For instance, the doctrines governing the creation of the agency
relationship, 186 the scope of authority an agent possesses, 187 or the attribution
of knowledge from agent to principal 188 all apply in the same ways in contract and tort.
Yet, this symmetry produces a puzzle because while many of agency’s
principles apply uniformly across contract and tort, an agent’s personal liability in contract and tort is strikingly different. In tort, an agent is jointly
and severally liable with the principal for any tort the agent commits within

184. Baird & Jackson, supra note 180, at 302.
185 . See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 2.01–.03; 2.05–.07; 3.01–.02; 3.05–.06;
4.01–.08; 6.01–.11 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) (addressing agency law’s role in governing contracting); id . §§ 2.04; 7.01–.08 (addressing agency law’s role in governing tort liability). There are
only eight chapters in the Restatement. Id .
186 . Id . § 3.01.
187 . Id . §§ 7.03–.04.
188 . Id . §§ 2.01–.07.
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the scope of his employment. 189 Personal liability for tortious conduct is inescapable for agents. 190 In contract, however, an agent exempts himself from
personal liability on the contracts he signs simply by identifying the principal on whose behalf he acts. 191 The common law goes further, actually, and
imposes a strong presumption that an agent entering a contract for a disclosed principal is not personally liable. 192 Conventional accounts of agency
fail to even address this basic structural discrepancy, let alone offer a cogent
explanation for it. Asset partitioning, however, provides precisely such an
explanation. It does so by identifying the factors that motivate the attribution rules of agency in contract (authority doctrine), clarifying their absence
in tort.
Specifically, the asset partitioning account explains the principal efficiency of the separation of the firm’s assets from those of its managers as
arising from the monitoring behavior of creditors. Contract creditors who
enter into contractual relationships with a principal do so voluntarily, fixing
the cost of credit (or other compensation) they demand based on the value
of the principal’s assets and their associated risks, given the creditors’ expertise in assessing them. 193 Such creditors benefit enormously from asset pools
that are specialized so as to permit the creditor to utilize her comparative advantages in assessing those assets 194—hence the important reduction in creditor monitoring costs that can arise as a result of asset partitioning. Tort
victims, however, are involuntary creditors—they suffer some harm without
their foreknowledge or consent and do not benefit from assessing the assets

189 . Id . §§ 7.03, 7.07–.08; see also Granquist v. Crystal Springs Lumber Co., 1 So. 2d 216,
218 (Miss. 1941) (“[W]hence the liability of the principal . . . has its sole basis in the doctrine of
respondeat superior and in nothing else, the liability is joint and several [between principal and
agent] . . . .”).
190. Musgrove v. Hickory Inn, Inc., 281 S.E.2d 499, 501 (W. Va. 1981) (“The doctrine of
respondeat superior does not relieve the servant of his tort liability.”); Wrigley v. Nottingham,
141 S.E.2d 859, 861 (Ga. Ct. App.) (“One who is sued in his personal capacity, whether the alter
ego, an officer or agent of a corporation, may not escape personal liability for his tortious misconduct damaging employees or third persons by hiding behind the corporate veil even in
those situations where the corporation might also be a proper party to the action.”), rev’d on
other grounds, 144 S.E.2d 749 (Ga. 1965).
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 1.04, 6.01.
192. Mason Tenders Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Thomasen Constr. Co., 164 F. Supp.
2d 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[A]n agent signing an agreement on his principal’s behalf, will
not be found personally liable under the terms of the agreement ‘unless there is clear and explicit evidence of the agent’s intention to substitute or superadd his personal liability for, or to,
that of his principal.’ ” (quoting Lerner v. Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union,
938 F.2d 2, 5 (2d Cir. 1991))); id . (“[P]ersonal liability is found ‘only in rare cases.’ ” (quoting
Lerner, 938 F.2d at 5)).
193. J. Stephen Gilbert, Note, Substantive Consolidation in Bankruptcy: A Primer, 43
VAND. L. REV. 207, 218 (1990) (“[V]oluntary creditors assess the risks of lending to a particular debtor and adjust the terms of the credit agreement accordingly.”).
194 . See supra Section II.C.1.
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of the tortfeasor. 195 Tort victims typically not only lack a contractual relationship with a firm and its agents, but are unsuspecting and involuntary
victims who could gain nothing from the partitioning of assets, which they
do not know of or monitor. 196 So, in the tort situation, agent shielding would
lessen a victim’s recovery from culpable players without the efficiency benefit of reducing information costs for those victims, while in contract, creditor
monitoring costs would be significantly increased by the imposition of joint
liability. The optimal level of joint liability between principal and agent will
differ based on whether creditors are voluntary or involuntary because that
will shape when monitoring costs are reduced by partitioning.
To put this point less technically, the difference between an agent’s liability in contract and tort boils down to the fact that the advantages of asset
partitioning derive from adjusting creditors who alter the cost of credit they
demand based on the ease with which they can monitor assets’ quality and
risk. The monitoring economies that make asset partitioning socially efficient in contract, rather than merely redistributive, disappear in tort, removing the main justification for the asset partitioning arrangement. 197
B. The Pattern of Agency Doctrine
In Part III, we looked at where agency law did and did not play an essential role by providing an economic benefit that parties could not have
achieved through contract. 198 There is a straightforward but fundamental
implication of that analysis: the common law doctrine of agency seems to
have generally arrived at the efficient level of “contractibility” for its rules. 199
Contractibility involves situations in which a rule of private law falls on the
spectrum between default rules, which parties can easily alter or waive
through contract, and mandatory rules, which parties cannot alter or
195. Steve Knippenberg, Commentary, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain: An Essay in
Reply, Reprisal, or Support?, 80 VA. L. REV. 1967, 1969–70 (1994) (“The most striking examples of involuntary creditors are tort victims[;] . . . they are unwilling creditors from the outset . . . .”); see also Charles A. Beckham, Jr., It’s All an Unsecured Claim to Me: The Tortious
Interference of Bankruptcy Law with Liability Insurance Proceeds, 22 T EX . T ECH L. REV. 779,
793 (1991) (“[T]he trade creditor has had an opportunity to estimate risk, the tort claimant has
not. . . . The tort claimant . . . is an involuntary creditor who has no opportunity to bargain
with its debtor; the tort claimant cannot choose a tortfeasor.”).
196 . See Andrew Price, Note, Tort Creditor Superpriority and Other Proposed Solutions to
Corporate Limited Liability and the Problem of Externalities, 2 G EO. M ASON U. L. REV. 439,
464 (1995) (“[I]nvoluntary creditors can not negotiate for these protections with the firm ex
ante because they do not know that they will be creditors until after the tort.”).
197 . Cf . 1 WILLIAM M EADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF C ORPORATIONS § 41.85 (perm ed., rev. vol. 2015) (“[T]he party seeking relief in a contract
case is presumed to have voluntarily and knowingly entered into an agreement with a corporate entity and is expected to suffer the consequences of the limited liability associated with the
corporate business form, while this is not the situation in tort cases.”).
198 . See supra Part III.
199 . See generally Ian Ayres, Response, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE
L.J. 881, 886 (2003) (discussing the meaning and importance of contractibility).
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waive. 200 We saw in Part III that the rules governing the duties owed by an
agent to a principal and by a principal to an agent were exclusively default
rules. 201 This makes sense given the ease with which parties can—and do—
carefully alter and craft these terms so as to maximize the economic benefit
of their relationship. 202 We also saw that there were significant economic
benefits to certain rules, which parties could not feasibly replicate through
private ordering and where the law alone could deliver those benefits. In
these circumstances, the law of agency indeed adopted mandatory rules. 203
This was the case with vicarious liability in tort and apparent authority in
contract. The account of agency law offered in this Article thus generates a
positive claim, which is that agency’s doctrine conforms to an efficient approach to the contractibility of its rules.
C. Agency and Technology
The core claim of this Article is that agency law’s essential functions are
in facilitating contracting among parties with no preexisting relationship
through asset partitioning and attribution rules. Agency would be difficult to
replicate in this respect in part because of the difficulty of monitoring agents’
contracting conduct by principals and the difficulty of credibly conveying
firm-specific agency rules in the absence of mandatory attribution rules. But
the calculus for both of these rules is a function of available technology, and
as technology changes, the importance of agency’s “essential roles” may lessen.
D. Agency and Business Outcomes
The law of agency will also shape the hiring decisions of employers
through how easily it applies apparent authority and other forms of principal
piercing. In particular, the balance that agency law adopts—between permitting flexibility to principals and agents in precisely tailoring agents’ authority
and limiting the costs to third parties of confusion about and investigation
into whether an agent is authorized—will be important. The greater the restrictions that the law places on private ordering for the sake of third parties
(i.e., the less latitude the law gives principals in defining the scope of agents’
authority), the more principals will have to carefully choose and standardize
their agents. For instance, if the law applied apparent authority based on a
presumption that agents generally have substantial authority, then principals
would generally designate fewer agents, each of whom would have to be

200 .
201 .
202 .
203 .

See id .
See supra Section III.C.1.
See supra notes 149–156, 162–163 and accompanying text.
See supra Sections III.A, III.C.2.
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more competent and trustworthy. 204 At the extreme, if the law imposed a
mandatory rule of plenary authority on agents with any actual contracting
authority, you would expect corporate entities to only designate a handful of
authorized agents. The relative flexibility that the law provides firms in defining the authority of agents thus shapes the employment decisions of managers.
This point is illustrated by the partnership. Merely because of her role, a
partner has the inherent power to bind the partnership for the purposes of
its ordinary affairs. As the Uniform Partnership Act puts it, “[e]very partner
is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the act of
every partner . . . for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of
the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership.” 205 This
means that whenever a partnership chooses a new partner, they automatically confer on that individual a substantial amount of authority over their
shared business and wealth. The consequence of this doctrine is well-known:
it “forces principals to select their agents with care to avoid losses attributable to dishonest agents.” 206 There are reasons to believe that such an arrangement will sometimes be efficient, 207 but the ubiquitous use of business
forms in which the authority of agents is placed more flexibly in management’s control suggests that firms also find substantial value in being able to
more precisely tailor and vary the authority they confer on agents.
E. Agency and the Role of Law in Commerce
A final implication of understanding agency law as asset partitioning is
at the level of theory. It has been nearly three decades since Bernard Black’s
seminal article asked whether corporate law is trivial because its mandatory
rules could easily be established (or circumvented) through private ordering. 208 Asset partitioning has provided perhaps the most compelling rejoin-

204. The apparent authority case law struggles with exactly this concern when deciding
what reasonable expectations a third party should have given particular pieces of evidence of
an employee’s authority. See, e .g ., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Recovery Express, Inc., 415 F. Supp. 2d
6, 11 (D. Mass. 2006) (“Granting an e-mail domain name [to an employee], by itself, does not
cloak the recipient with carte blanche authority to act on behalf the grantee. Were this so, every
subordinate employee with a company e-mail address—down to the night watchman—could
bind a company to the same contracts as the president.”); MuscleTech Research & Dev., Inc. v.
E. Coast Ingredients, LLC, No. 00-CV-0753A(F), 2004 WL 941815, at *32 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 25,
2004) (holding that possession of business cards with a company’s logo and a company credit
card as well as appearing in company advertisements were insufficient to create apparent authority).
205. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 9(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1914).
206. Don L. Kristinik, III, Note, Transferring Title to Partnership Real Property Under the
UPA and Proposed RUPA, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & T R . J. 143, 161 (1992).
207. Fama & Jensen, supra note 175, at 333.
208. Black, supra note 118; see also Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of
the Firm, 88 J. POL. E CON. 288, 289 (1980) (“The firm is viewed as a set of contracts . . . .”).
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der to the claim that corporate law is trivial in this way. 209 The capacity of
firms to maintain separate asset pools from their owners and agents can be
enormously efficient and could not be feasibly achieved through private ordering. It turns out to be the dimensions of corporate law that limit the ability of owners and managers to exercise the legal personality of the firm (i.e.,
to contractually bind it) that provide the firm with economic advantages that
contracting could not achieve. The firm, as an efficient method of organizing
business transactions, only exists net of these asset partitioning devices: owner shielding and agent shielding, and more importantly, entity shielding and
principal shielding. Far from being merely a nexus of contracts, the firm is
also a nexus of attribution and partition.
CONCLUSION
When scholars consider agency’s contribution to commerce, they typically focus on elements of agency law that parties can and do freely alter or
dispense with contractually. In contrast, the essential contributions of agency
law are its attribution rules and asset partitioning. Where organizational law
partitions off the assets of a firm from the assets of its individual owners,
agency law partitions off the assets of a firm from the assets of its individual
agents. The establishment of a commercial firm whose assets are shielded
from the personal creditors of its insiders thus requires both organizational
law and agency law.
Recognizing how agency separates the assets of firms and their managers
makes three additional contributions. First, it allows the identification of
important efficiencies that agency law alone can provide to business enterprise. Appreciating these efficiencies enables a more sophisticated analysis of
whether given doctrines, like inherent authority, serve the basic goals of
agency law. Second, it facilitates an analysis of agency’s doctrine that explains why it assumes the form it does. This allows not only for the rationalization of the contractibility of agency’s rules, and of the differences in
doctrine between contract and tort, but also for the identification of unappreciated strains in agency’s case law, such as the equitable doctrines that
pierce the shield between the firm and agents’ assets. It also suggests a research agenda for further economic analysis of agency law, including the distinct justifications for agent and principal piercing as opposed to traditional
veil piercing. Lastly, this asset partitioning account constitutes a justification
of agency law. Far from an arcane body of unnecessary rules, the law of
agency is essential to commerce.

209 .

See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 9, at 416.
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